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INTRODUCTION 
Perry v. Brown, the federal lawsuit challenging Proposition 8—the 
California state constitutional amendment prohibiting marriage for same-sex 
couples—was filed in 2009.1 At that time, it presented sweeping federal 
constitutional claims for marriage equality and sought to ultimately put those 
claims before the U.S. Supreme Court.2 The suit defied the strategic vision of 
lawyers at the leading lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) legal 
organizations—Lambda Legal, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
the National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR), and Gay & Lesbian 
Advocates & Defenders (GLAD). Those lawyers had attempted to keep the 
federal courts away from Proposition 8 and similar state laws.3 Yet a new 
organization, the American Foundation for Equal Rights (AFER), filed the 
Perry suit. AFER’s effort boasted considerable support from elites and 
operated within an increasingly favorable legal and political environment.4 
AFER’s well-resourced challenge to conventional movement wisdom 
materialized in large part because LGBT movement advocates had achieved so 
much success using a legal mobilization strategy—one that deployed litigation 
in conjunction with a range of other tactics and exploited the mobilizing and 
political potential of rights claims.5 In this Article, I argue that understanding 
the Perry litigation through the lens of social movements exposes a tension in 
legal mobilization that movement advocates must confront and that scholarly 
 
 1 Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW). Filed in district court as Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the case name 
changed to Perry v. Brown on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 
 2 Before this Article went to print, the Ninth Circuit panel decided the case on especially narrow 
grounds, resisting the plaintiffs’ invitation to consider whether same-sex couples enjoy a fundamental right to 
marry and whether sexual-orientation-based classifications merit heightened scrutiny for equal protection 
purposes. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1076 (9th Cir. 2012). Instead, the court held that, because 
California maintains a separate domestic-partnership system that provides the state law rights and benefits of 
marriage to same-sex couples and because California voters eliminated same-sex couples’ existing right to 
marry, Proposition 8 fails even rational-basis review for equal protection purposes. See id. at 1086–90. 
 3 ACLU ET AL., WHY THE BALLOT BOX AND NOT THE COURTS SHOULD BE THE NEXT STEP ON 
MARRIAGE IN CALIFORNIA (2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/lgbt/ballot_box_20090527.pdf. 
 4 See Jesse McKinley, Same-Sex Vote Unlikely in California, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2011, at A15. 
Throughout this Article, I use the term “elites” to refer generally to nonmovement actors from political, legal, 
and cultural arenas, with resources and/or influence. 
 5 For an elaboration of legal mobilization, see MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY 
REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 5–12 (1994); Michael McCann, Law and Social 
Movements, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 506, 508 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004); and 
Frances Kahn Zemans, Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the Political System, 77 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 690 (1983). 
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accounts have failed to fully capture: The same strategy that yields movement 
progress may channel tactical conflict into powerful litigation that threatens 
and redirects that strategy. This is what I term the legal mobilization dilemma. 
Successful legal mobilization facilitates threats to movement strategy coming 
not from the state or the countermovement but from forces inside or allied with 
the movement itself.6 In identifying the origins and implications of the legal 
mobilization dilemma, this Article analyzes an unexpected cost of highly 
successful litigation-based strategies. 
As scholars have long acknowledged, litigation represents an attractive 
option for groups disadvantaged in the political process.7 The access provided 
by courts distinguishes litigation from other institutional tactics. Courts 
generally have an obligation to hear and consider a group’s grievance, even 
when lawmakers do not provide a forum. And because courts enjoy some 
degree of independence, they may advance the group’s cause even when 
political actors and the general public remain relatively hostile. Ultimately, a 
single judicial decision, positive or negative, may exert significant influence on 
the process of social change. 
The openness and accessibility that make courts so appealing to movement 
activists also yield risks of movement conflict and fragmentation.8 While 
litigation facilitates access to power for marginalized groups, it also allows 
individuals to speak on behalf of a group and bind other group members. 
Litigation contrasts with more group-oriented models of legislation and direct 
democracy, permitting individualized action less feasible in other institutional 
arenas.9 Unlike the legislative process, where the legislative body (both 
formally and informally) recognizes and authorizes certain group 
representatives to influence debate, or the initiative process, where a ballot 
 
 6 I am not documenting the radical flank effect that other scholars have observed. See, e.g., Catherine 
Albiston, Response, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement Strategy, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61, 
70–71 (2011), http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_96_Albiston.pdf (“Social-movement scholars have 
identified a radical flank effect in which the demands and actions of the radical actors within a social 
movement cause the state to grant the more moderate demands made by other actors because those demands 
seem reasonable in comparison.”). Instead, the movement actors I analyze share a goal (marriage equality) and 
generally view the specific tactic (litigation) favorably, but they disagree on the strategic deployment and 
timing of that tactic. 
 7 See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW 
REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 22 (1978). 
 8 At the same time, the fragmentation facilitated by litigation may diversify a movement by giving a 
voice and access to those outside the inner circle of movement leadership. 
 9 See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and 
Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1623–27 (1997). 
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initiative must attract signatures and funding, litigation is a relatively 
inexpensive way for an individual to access an official decision-making 
process with no requirement that the claimant truly represent the group.10 
While legislative lobbying and initiative campaigns require some level of 
movement consensus and coordination, litigation can be launched by almost 
any movement member at almost any time. And yet the mere act of filing suit 
may attract publicity and media attention for an organization or individual 
otherwise not considered a significant movement actor.11 More importantly, a 
lawsuit may result in a judicial decision that affects other movement members 
and restricts the movement going forward. 
As a general matter, litigation poses a threat when tactical disagreement 
arises; any single movement member can initiate a lawsuit that threatens to 
bind the entire movement.12 But sustained and successful legal mobilization 
may make litigation an especially appealing and powerful option through 
which to contest movement strategy. By attracting constituent and elite support 
for court-centered tactics and by making litigation more viable as both a 
political and doctrinal matter, successful legal mobilization may channel 
tactical conflict into potent lawsuits that have the capacity to significantly 
redirect the movement’s strategic trajectory. 
In identifying and analyzing the legal mobilization dilemma, this Article 
brings together three bodies of scholarship. The first examines the role of cause 
lawyers representing social movements, specifically exploring the relationship 
between litigation and intragroup difference. Derrick Bell’s seminal article, 
Serving Two Masters, analyzed the ethical issues raised by NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund (LDF) lawyers’ work on school desegregation 
litigation.13 In acknowledging the influence of class interests and donor 
pressure on lawyer goals and tactics, Bell exposed the tensions inherent in 
cause lawyers’ representation of large, diverse groups.14 He specifically 
encouraged lawyer restraint and prioritized responsiveness to client 
preferences.15 While Bell focused on post-Brown v. Board of Education16 
 
 10 See id. at 1650. 
 11 See MCCANN, supra note 5, at 58 (“One key to effective legal mobilization as a movement building 
strategy was the tremendous amount of mainstream media attention generated by dramatic early lawsuits.”). 
 12 See Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 1650 (“The individualist procedural rules thus create the very 
situation that gives rise to the group member disputes . . . .”). 
 13 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
 14 See id. at 489–91. 
 15 See id. at 512. 
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litigation, Mark Tushnet explored ideological and strategic differences in the 
litigation campaign leading up to Brown.17 Tushnet situated the centralization 
of litigation strategy, through LDF, as an important “political” solution to the 
problems of intragroup difference and strategic coordination.18 William 
Rubenstein broadened the lens to include other movements and shifted 
attention toward the operation of group decision making, both among lawyers 
and constituents.19 Rubenstein attended to the dangerous group-based effects 
of individual lawsuits20 and proposed procedural and ethical solutions to the 
problems posed by the individualist model of litigation in the social movement 
context.21 Scholarship that can broadly be described as cause lawyering work 
builds on and extends insights offered by Bell, Tushnet, and Rubenstein by 
focusing on the dynamics of intragroup difference within social movements 
and on the implications of such difference for the role of lawyers.22 
A second body of scholarship, sociolegal work on legal mobilization, 
uncovers the impact of law and litigation on social movements.23 Even as the 
legal mobilization perspective recognizes the constraints of court-centered 
tactics, it views the role of law expansively and sees litigation as a potentially 
powerful resource available to social movement actors.24 While acknowledging 
that favorable judicial decisions may secure tangible rights and benefits for 
movement constituents, legal mobilization scholars devote significant attention 
 
 16 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 17 See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–
1950, at 138–58 (1987). 
 18 Id. at 157. 
 19 See Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 1626. 
 20 See id. at 1637–39. 
 21 See id. at 1668–80. 
 22 See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 805, 838 (2008) (exploring the role of lawyers in negotiating the tension between individual clients, who 
may be “covering” stigmatized identities, and broader group-based interests); Nancy Morawetz, 
Counterbalancing Distorted Incentives in Supreme Court Pro Bono Practice: Recommendations for the New 
Supreme Court Pro Bono Bar and Public Interest Practice Communities, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 134–36 
(2011) (situating coordination—or lack thereof—of Supreme Court litigation within scholarly debates over 
litigation tactics and over lawyer responsiveness to client needs); Douglas NeJaime, Note, Marriage, Cruising, 
and Life in Between: Clarifying Organizational Positionalities in Pursuit of Polyvocal Gay-Based Advocacy, 
38 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 511, 517–20 (2003) (locating representational ethics in LGBT rights litigation 
within scholarly debates over intragroup difference and over client representation). 
 23 For the seminal work in this field, see MCCANN, supra note 5. 
 24 See, e.g., id. at 10–11; see also CATHERINE R. ALBISTON, INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND THE 
MOBILIZATION OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: RIGHTS ON LEAVE 13 (2010); Lisa Vanhala, Social 
Movements Lashing Back: Law, Social Change and Intra-Social Movement Backlash in Canada, 54 STUD. L. 
POL. & SOC. 113, 118–19 (2011). 
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to litigation’s productive indirect effects.25 Inside a movement, activists deploy 
litigation to mobilize and empower constituents and to aid fundraising.26 
Outside a movement, advocates use litigation to gain publicity, raise funds 
from foundations and allies, obtain leverage with government officials, 
convince the public, and influence elites.27 While these benefits may emerge 
from legal victory, they may also result from the initial act of rights claiming 
and from the mere process of litigation.28 In fact, advocates may even use 
litigation loss to raise consciousness, fundraise, and bargain with state decision 
makers.29 
Finally, a third body of scholarship, social movement theory, emerges 
primarily from sociology (and, to a lesser extent, political science and related 
disciplines) and informs the theoretical framework applied by legal 
 
 25 See, e.g., ALBISTON, supra note 24, at 189–90; MCCANN, supra note 5, at 284–85; MICHAEL PARIS, 
FRAMING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: LAW AND THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 9–10 (2010); Austin 
Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do for, and to, Social Movements: An Introduction, in CAUSE 
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1, 10–12 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006). For a review 
of some of the central contributions to this literature, see Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public 
Interest Litigation: Insights from Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 609–12 (2009). In other 
work, I have set up a distinction between internal and external effects, distinguishing implications inside the 
movement from those outside the movement, to catalog the indirect benefits of litigation. See Douglas 
NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 969–1011 (2011). Catherine Albiston has carefully 
elaborated this distinction into a formal typology. See Albiston, supra note 6, at 64 tbl.1. 
 26 See Albiston, supra note 6, at 64 tbl.1; see also STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: 
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 131 (1974); Sandra R. Levitsky, To Lead with Law: 
Reassessing the Influence of Legal Advocacy Organizations in Social Movements, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 25, at 145, 147; Michael W. McCann, How Does Law Matter for Social 
Movements?, in HOW DOES LAW MATTER? 76, 83–84 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998); Laura 
Beth Nielsen, Social Movements, Social Process: A Response to Gerald Rosenberg, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
671, 680 (2009); Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Rights Revisited, in GOVERNING THROUGH COURTS 193, 
204 (Richard A.L. Gambitta et al. eds., 1981). 
 27 See Albiston, supra note 6, at 64 tbl.1; see also HANDLER, supra note 7, at 30–31; MCCANN, supra 
note 5, at 10; GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS 
POLITICS 21–25 (2009); McCann, supra note 5, at 514. 
 28 See MCCANN, supra note 5, at 280; SCHEINGOLD, supra note 26, at 49–53; Scott Barclay & Shauna 
Fisher, Cause Lawyers in the First Wave of Same Sex Marriage Litigation, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, supra note 25, at 84, 92; Mary Bernstein et al., The Challenge of Law: Sexual Orientation, 
Gender Identity, and Social Movements, in QUEER MOBILIZATIONS: LGBT ACTIVISTS CONFRONT THE LAW 1, 
6 (Scott Barclay et al. eds., 2009); Susan M. Olson, The Political Evolution of Interest Group Litigation, in 
GOVERNING THROUGH COURTS, supra note 26, at 225, 227; William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk 
Different from All Other Rights Talk? Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 1771, 1805 (1994) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993)). 
 29 See NeJaime, supra note 25, at 983–1002. Albiston provides a formal typology, in which she separates 
the positive and negative effects that emerge from litigation wins, litigation losses, and merely “playing the 
[litigation] game.” See Albiston, supra note 6, at 66, 67 tbl.2. 
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mobilization scholars.30 Social movement scholars analyze how movements 
materialize and operate, devoting attention both to processes of mobilization 
and to methods of persuasion and survival.31 Social movement work generally 
distinguishes between confrontational tactics, including direct action, protest, 
and disruption, and institutional tactics, including legislative advocacy, 
electoral politics, and litigation; this work traditionally associates the former 
with more radical movement politics and the latter with movement moderation 
and co-optation.32 Yet social movement scholars have devoted scant attention 
to the operation and effects of litigation, and therefore have left largely 
unexamined the field’s underlying assumptions regarding court-centered 
tactics.33 
In specifically exploring the role of litigation in tactical conflicts within 
movements, this Article seeks to bring scholarship on lawyering and legal 
mobilization more concretely to social movement work.34 Social movement 
scholarship would benefit from additional empirical work on the relationship 
between litigation and movement mobilization to unpack, and perhaps qualify, 
underlying assumptions about institutional tactics. At the same time, sociolegal 
 
 30 See McCann, supra note 5, at 506 (“[Legal mobilization theory] merges a dynamic dispute-oriented, 
interpretivist understanding of legal practice with insights from social movement theorizing about collective 
action based on ‘political process.’” (citations omitted)); see also PARIS, supra note 25, at 19; Steven E. 
Barkan, Political Trials and Resource Mobilization: Towards an Understanding of Social Movement 
Litigation, 58 SOC. FORCES 944, 945 (1980). 
 31 See, e.g., FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY 
SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 4–5, 24 (1977); J. Craig Jenkins, Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of 
Social Movements, 9 ANN. REV. SOC. 527, 528 (1983); David S. Meyer, Protest and Political Opportunities, 
30 ANN. REV. SOC. 125 (2004); David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and 
Movement Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464 (1986). 
 32 See, e.g., Hanspeter Kriesi, The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political 
Context, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING 
STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS 152, 158 (Doug McAdam et al. eds., 1996); Suzanne Staggenborg, 
The Consequences of Professionalization and Formalization in the Pro-Choice Movement, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 
585, 604 (1988). 
 33 See Paul Burstein, Legal Mobilization as a Social Movement Tactic: The Struggle for Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 96 AM. J. SOC. 1201, 1203 (1991) (“Those interested in social movements see 
themselves as examining political behavior not directed into ‘proper channels’—that is, demonstrations, 
strikes, and boycotts, as opposed to election campaigns, lobbying, or legal proceedings.”). 
 34 Joel Handler’s foundational and highly influential work first bridged the gap between social 
movements and sociolegal studies, see HANDLER, supra note 7, yet did not yield sustained incorporation of 
social movement theory in legal scholarship or extensive work on litigation in social movement scholarship. 
As Edward Rubin argues, “Social scientists do not involve themselves in the technical, seemingly arcane 
details of legal doctrine, legislative drafting, or administrative rulemaking. And legal scholars do not venture 
into the chaotic, empirical world of mobilization, recruitment, political strategy, and organizational behavior.” 
Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 51 (2001). 
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work and legal scholarship can benefit from crucial insights from social 
movement theory. The legal mobilization framework derives from a theoretical 
perspective that draws on key social movement insights,35 and legal scholars 
increasingly have used a social movement lens to understand constitutional 
culture and the effects of law on mobilization.36 Even as a significant body of 
work now comes under the heading of law and social movements, theoretical 
concepts and empirical observations from social movement theory are rarely 
used to directly inform sociolegal analysis37 and constitutional scholarship.38 
 
 35 See McCann, supra note 5, at 506. 
 36 See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 
(2011); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); Jack M. 
Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 
39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (2005); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social 
Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 
(1997) [hereinafter Balkin, The Constitution of Status]; Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding 
the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-
Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); 
William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999); Risa L. Goluboff, “We 
Live’s in a Free House Such as It Is”: Class and the Creation of Modern Civil Rights, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1977 
(2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric 
Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, 
Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006); Robert 
C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and 
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social 
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001). 
 37 Michael McCann has made a compelling case for more explicit interactions between these fields. See 
McCann, supra note 5, at 519. For notable examples of recent scholarship that links sociolegal work explicitly 
to social movement theory, see Kathryn Abrams, Emotions in the Mobilization of Rights, 46 HARV. C.R.–C.L. 
L. REV. 551, 553–72 (2011); Scott Barclay et al., Two Spinning Wheels: Studying Law and Social Movements, 
54 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 1, 2–5 (2011); Bernstein et al., supra note 28, at 7–12; Burstein, supra note 33, at 
1202; Cummings & Rhode, supra note 25, at 613–15; Lynn C. Jones, Exploring the Sources of Cause and 
Career Correspondence Among Cause Lawyers, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND 
AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE 203, 203–04 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005); Anna-Maria 
Marshall, Social Movement Strategies and the Participatory Potential of Litigation, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 25, at 164, 165–68; Stephen Meili, Consumer Cause Lawyers in the United 
States: Lawyers for the Movement or a Movement unto Themselves?, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, supra note 25, at 120, 121; Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal 
Framing Processes and Transformation of the Women’s Movement in the 1960s, 111 AM. J. SOC. 1718, 1723–
24 (2006); and Steven A. Boutcher, Making Lemonade: Turning Adverse Decisions into Opportunities for 
Mobilization, AMICI (Am. Sociological Ass’n, Wash., D.C.), Fall 2005, at 8, 8–9. 
 38 But see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements 
and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 
YALE L.J. 941 (1997); Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional 
Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871 (1999); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006); Mary Ziegler, 
Framing Change: Cause Lawyering, Constitutional Decisions, and Social Change, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 263 
NEJAIME GALLEYS4 7/5/2012 2:02 PM 
2012] THE LEGAL MOBILIZATION DILEMMA 671 
My contribution demonstrates that, with a more comprehensive turn to social 
movement theory, we can explicitly identify and analyze an otherwise-
unobserved phenomenon in legal mobilization and gain a more nuanced 
understanding of the impact of institutional tactics on social movement 
activity. 
Before proceeding, it is important to comment on methodology and to 
consider the broader applicability of my analysis. This Article uses the Perry 
litigation as a case study for contemplating the challenges that may flow from a 
successful legal mobilization strategy. In an effort to provide a rich, detailed 
account of the underlying events, I rely on a variety of materials, including 
judicial decisions, legal briefs, oral argument recordings, movement 
documents, organizational documents, media reports, interviews, and 
secondary academic sources. There are both benefits and limitations to this 
methodological approach. Even though I rely on an extensive set of materials, 
one could level reasonable challenges to my account. 
Despite the highly detailed and context-specific nature of this case study, 
some of the key insights may be generalizable. That developments in the 
LGBT movement map onto observations made by scholars in a variety of 
movement settings suggests that advocates in other movements likely face the 
legal mobilization dilemma. More specifically, work on the role of litigation in 
the civil rights movement demonstrates that lawyers at LDF confronted 
disagreement over movement strategy, both from within the organization and 
from organizational outsiders.39 Tushnet shows that, on several occasions, 
Thurgood Marshall and other leading LDF attorneys dealt with lawsuits that 
defied NAACP strategy and threatened the organization’s control. For 
instance, Carter Wesley, a Texas lawyer, directly contravened Marshall’s 
decision to abandon equalization suits and instead pursue a direct attack on 
segregation.40 By forming a new organization, the Texas Conference for the 
Equalization of Educational Opportunities, and gaining the support of 
movement constituents in Texas, Wesley posed a direct, confrontational 
 
(2010); cf. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
(2009); Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual 
Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008). For an insightful analysis of the lack of overlap between legal scholarship 
and social movement theory, see Rubin, supra note 34. 
 39 Tushnet documents how, at one point, younger LDF lawyers favored a direct assault on segregation, 
while Thurgood Marshall continued to favor a more measured and incremental strategy. See TUSHNET, supra 
note 17, at 111. 
 40 See id. at 107–08. 
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challenge to NAACP tactics.41 Not only did Wesley’s suit threaten to create 
damaging precedent, it also pushed a claim that appeared to contradict the 
NAACP’s claims.42 Marshall responded by attempting to integrate Wesley’s 
strategy into pending NAACP suits, situating equalization as merely an 
alternative remedy for claims of discrimination.43 
Similarly, Rubenstein notes how George Vaughn, a St. Louis attorney, filed 
a petition for certiorari in Shelley v. Kraemer, the now-famous restrictive 
covenant case,44 against the advice of Marshall, who believed that the 
NAACP’s position needed further development before presentation to the 
Supreme Court.45 Vaughn had been involved in a conference convened by 
Marshall to discuss restrictive covenant cases and to coordinate strategy, but 
by the time Marshall convened the second conference on the topic and 
resolved to delay pushing the issue at the Supreme Court, Vaughn was already 
preparing Shelley for Supreme Court review.46 Quickly responding, Marshall 
and his LDF colleagues took control of a similar case in Michigan and 
convinced the Court to consolidate it with Shelley.47 
In addition to work on the civil rights movement, which has become 
paradigmatic in sociolegal and social movement scholarship, research on other 
movements would provide additional data with which to analyze the legal 
mobilization dilemma. For instance, litigation has been a significant 
contributor to the environmental movement’s success.48 Robust legislation 
authorized citizen suits, thus opening key avenues for litigation by 
environmental organizations.49 According to Cary Coglianese’s analysis, as the 
environmental movement attained insider status, advocates shifted away from 
sweeping lawsuits and “toward more routine, even defensive use of the 
courts.”50 Coglianese claims that the increasing institutionalization and 
professionalization of the movement correlated with movement activity 
 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 109. 
 44 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 45 Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 1627–28. 
 46 Id. at 1629. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See Marshall, supra note 37, at 171 (“[E]nvironmental justice organizations turn again and again to 
litigation to pursue their goals.”). 
 49 Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the Environmental 
Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 98 (2001). 
 50 Id. at 99. 
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seeking to preserve, rather than expand, the movement’s earlier successes.51 
But with renewed activism among segments of the environmental movement, 
challenges to conventional strategy and objectives emerged.52 Environmental 
activists mobilized constituents under new ideological visions and deployed 
litigation to advance these visions.53 Indeed, Coglianese argues that some of 
the greatest challenges the environmental movement faces come from within 
its own ranks.54 
Attention to movements on the Right could also shed light on the legal 
mobilization dilemma. As Reva Siegel shows, the anti-abortion movement has 
experienced ruptures over legal tactics targeting Roe v. Wade.55 While many of 
the most established movement groups, including the National Right to Life 
Committee and Americans United for Life, favor the continued incremental 
diminishment of abortion rights, other organizations and movement leaders are 
urging a direct attack on Roe.56 Without many opportunities for affirmative 
litigation, those encouraging a more aggressive approach have pushed 
controversial state legislative measures, such as fetal-heartbeat bills, that would 
prompt legal challenges.57 As these state bills move forward, it will be 
important to see how movement leaders and organizations attempt to shape the 
ensuing litigation.58 
 
 51 See id. at 100–01. 
 52 Id. at 105. 
 53 See id. at 105–06. 
 54 See id. at 107. Martha Davis’s work on the welfare rights movement also provides relevant material. 
See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973 (1993). 
Davis documents the conflict over litigation timing between a leading impact litigation organization, the 
Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, and local legal-services lawyers. See id. at 62–63. 
 55 See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 
117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1709 (2008) (discussing intramovement disputes over how best to attack Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 133 (1973), and the right to abortion). 
 56 See id.; see also Erik Eckholm, Anti-Abortion Groups Are Split on Legal Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 
2011, at A1. 
 57 See Eckholm, supra note 56. 
 58 Siegel’s work with Linda Greenhouse also suggests possible implications for the legal mobilization 
dilemma on the pro-choice side of the abortion conflict. Siegel and Greenhouse document the lead-up to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Roe, showing that litigations were pending around the country, and courts were 
responding to both public-health and feminist frames in liberalizing abortion restrictions. BEFORE ROE V. 
WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 119–20 (Linda 
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2010); Ruth Roemer, Abortion Law Reform and Repeal: Legislative and 
Judicial Developments (March, 1971), in BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING, supra, at 121, 122–25. While Women versus Connecticut and its 
lawyers, Nancy Stearns (from the Center for Constitutional Rights) and Catherine Roraback (who was 
involved in the Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), litigation), led the effort in Connecticut, see 
Women vs. Connecticut Organizing Pamphlet (Circa November 1970), in BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT 
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Of course, we should not expect to observe the legal mobilization dilemma 
in every movement context. For example, work on the disability rights 
movement points to conditions that, in some ways, defy the phenomenon 
observed in this Article. Michael Waterstone, Michael Stein, and David 
Wilkin’s work on disability cause lawyers suggests that the presence of an 
omnibus federal statute—the Americans with Disabilities Act59 (ADA)—along 
with the absence of strong constitutional protections,60 may produce a 
movement trajectory that is not characterized by strong movement 
coordination of litigation.61 In this context, disability cause lawyers pursue 
cases to enforce statutory rights and do so with an eye toward lower court 
victories and settlement.62 On the other hand, Supreme Court litigation on 
disability rights features predominantly private, nonmovement lawyers 
pressing claims, often unsuccessfully, that seek to expand the ADA’s 
coverage.63 The lack of movement coordination may pose less risk than in 
other social movement contexts because the nature of cases seeking 
enforcement of statutory rights differs from “the high-stakes, preclusive nature 
of constitutional litigation.”64 Exploring differences observed in the disability 
rights movement may provide crucial material with which to better understand 
how and why the legal mobilization dilemma materializes. Indeed, comparing 
the work of the environmental movement, for instance, to the disability rights 
movement in the wake of legislative victories could provide important insights 
into the role of coordinated legal strategies in movement development and into 
 
SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING, supra, at 167, 167–68, 224, two 
University of Texas Law School graduates, Sarah Weddington and Linda Coffee, filed what would become 
Roe v. Wade in Texas, see BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE 
SUPREME COURT’S RULING, supra, at 224. To better assess the likelihood of the legal mobilization dilemma in 
this context, we would need to ask more questions about pro-choice movement coordination and tactical 
contestation. Cf. SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM IN 
THE ABORTION CONFLICT 103–09 (1991) (discussing the increasing professionalization and formalization of 
the pro-choice movement, along with reliance on institutionalized tactics, single-issue organizations, and 
rotating leadership). 
 59 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
 60 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 61 Michael Ashley Stein et al., Cause Lawyering for People with Disabilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 
1662 (2010) (reviewing BAGENSTOS, supra note 38). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Michael E. Waterstone et al., Disability Cause Lawyers, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1287, 1347 
(2012). Nonetheless, disability cause lawyers’ attempts to derail unwanted Supreme Court litigation, see Stein 
et al., supra note 62, at 1676–77 (“[S]ome long-time disability cause lawyers have urged withdrawal or 
settlement of ADA cases granted certiorari, with a pair of victories.” (footnote omitted)), resonate with 
observations made in this Article. 
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the relationship between movement coordination and the legal mobilization 
dilemma. 
Finally, an important qualification is necessary at the outset. The issues 
posed by the legal mobilization dilemma raise theoretical and empirical 
questions about movement boundaries. My analysis, to a great extent, situates 
lawyers at the main LGBT rights organizations as voices for the organized 
movement. The new organization, AFER, stands in contrast to these movement 
leaders. Yet as much as AFER emerged largely from individuals who had not 
previously taken leading roles in LGBT legal activity and had not worked for 
other LGBT social movement organizations,65 the individuals who founded 
AFER understand themselves as part of the broader movement and situate the 
organization as a movement leader.66 For purposes of this Article, I bracket 
questions about where the LGBT movement ends and allied or outsider support 
begins, leaving such questions for future work. Rather than focus on the 
dynamics between movement insiders and outsiders, I concentrate on the way 
in which successful legal mobilization strategies may prove particularly 
susceptible to tactical contestation. The argument I advance in this Article does 
not hinge on the question of movement definition. 
Nonetheless, I make a distinction between clear movement strategy—the 
strategy coordinated by activists at LGBT rights organizations that have led the 
movement for many years—and challenges to that strategy by movement 
constituents and new movement organizations. When a same-sex couple brings 
a marriage suit against the advice of advocates at LGBT rights organizations, 
that couple clearly contravenes movement strategy. When an organization like 
AFER forms for the purpose of bringing litigation that the leading LGBT 
rights organizations explicitly refused to bring, that organization also 
contravenes movement strategy, even as it becomes part of the movement, lays 
claim to a leadership role, and redirects and thereby constitutes movement 
strategy. 
 
 65 It appears that only one AFER staff member was previously employed by an LGBT movement 
organization. See Leadership, AM. FOUND. FOR EQUAL RTS., http://www.afer.org/about/leadership (last visited 
July 5, 2012). Shumway Marshall, AFER’s Online Director, did similar work at Equality California. Id. 
 66 See About Us, AM. FOUND. FOR EQUAL RTS., http://www.afer.org/about/the-foundation/ (last visited 
July 5, 2012) (“As the sole sponsor of the federal court challenge of California’s Proposition 8, . . . AFER is 
leading the fight for marriage equality . . . .”). Through their challenge, AFER leaders became important 
movement actors. And AFER’s founder, Chad Griffin, was recently tapped to head the Human Rights 
Campaign, the most resource-rich LGBT rights organization. See Andrew Harmon, Chad Griffin Named 
President of HRC, ADVOCATE (Mar. 2, 2012, 2:52 PM), http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_News/ 
2012/03/02/Chad_Griffin_Named_President_of_HRC/. 
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I focuses on legal mobilization as 
a coordinated LGBT movement strategy, specifically framing the pre-Perry 
strategy as an incremental state-based approach. The LGBT movement’s 
national marriage-equality strategy seizes on the power of state-based change. 
The movement’s state court litigation has contributed substantially to progress 
on marriage equality. The first comprehensive relationship-recognition regime 
was initiated by a state court,67 and the first state to offer marriage to same-sex 
couples did so pursuant to a state supreme court order.68 Even when litigation 
has not led directly to marriage or relationship rights for same-sex couples, it 
has served important publicity, public-education, and bargaining purposes for 
the movement.69 
In Part II, I situate litigation as a potent vehicle for pressing strategic 
dissent and defying the incremental state-based strategy adopted by leading 
LGBT movement lawyers. First, I suggest why litigation is a particularly 
attractive form of activism for movement actors who seek to depart from the 
movement’s coordinated strategy. Then I locate the Perry litigation within the 
trajectory of lawsuits that reflect tactical contestation. Suits contravening the 
movement’s state-by-state approach have either targeted unfavorable states or 
pursued federal claims in federal courts. But while movement lawyers limited 
the impact of many earlier litigation-based threats to movement tactics, 
AFER’s effort presents a far different scenario; it derives from a resource-rich 
organization, draws on high-profile, elite support, and boasts prestigious legal 
representation. 
Understanding Perry relative to other controversial lawsuits points to the 
ways in which sustained legal mobilization may heighten both the likelihood of 
unwanted litigation and the threat to movement strategy posed by that 
litigation. To develop this account, Part III uses insights from social movement 
work to explain how successful legal mobilization may channel strategic 
contestation into especially potent litigation. As legal mobilization changes 
internal movement circumstances and external political and legal conditions, 
lawsuits that depart from coordinated movement strategy may emerge—and 
may do so with increased power and support. First, legal mobilization 
produced a key effect within the LGBT movement—increased mobilization 
around the legal right to marry. The battles over marriage that played out 
 
 67 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 68 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 69 See Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 
1235, 1312 (2010). 
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largely through litigation mobilized constituents around the constitutional, 
rights-based concept of marriage as the key to LGBT equality. This 
mobilization created additional opportunities and increased support for 
activism and litigation aimed at securing the right to marry. Second, legal 
mobilization produced a key effect outside the LGBT movement—the 
mainstreaming of marriage equality and LGBT equality norms more generally. 
The movement’s legal mobilization strategy contributed to significant changes 
in attitudes toward marriage equality among private elites and state actors, and 
these changes created an environment supportive of a sweeping federal 
marriage lawsuit. Elite support allowed movement constituents to find new 
resources with which to pursue the central movement goal of marriage 
equality. And advocates now find more sympathetic elites in state government 
and in the federal judiciary. These elite alignments work together, such that the 
new movement organization, AFER, confronts more hospitable federal judges 
at both the district court and appellate court levels, and these judges must 
address and respond to the California state government’s opposition to 
Proposition 8. These judges are also equipped with crucial doctrinal 
developments, which have been produced by successful LGBT rights litigation 
and which create opportunities for more expansive pro-LGBT judicial 
decisions. 
I. LEGAL MOBILIZATION AND MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
In this Part, I situate the LGBT movement’s marriage-equality campaign as 
a largely state-based legal mobilization strategy. Attention to this state-
centered approach demonstrates that movement lawyers use litigation in ways 
that seize on its potential and yet appreciate its limitations. Early marriage 
litigation focused on state law claims in states with favorable background 
conditions. Only recently have advocates pursued a limited federal litigation 
strategy, and in doing so, they have sought to specifically build on important 
state-based advances. Understanding the state-by-state strategy adopted by 
leading LGBT movement advocates aids the subsequent analysis of Perry, 
which directly opposed and challenged the incremental state-centered approach 
by pursuing a sweeping federal lawsuit for marriage equality. 
In situating legal mobilization as a leading LGBT movement strategy, I am 
positioning lawyers as leading social movement activists. Contrary to common 
assumptions in scholarship on social movements, cause lawyering and legal 
mobilization scholars recognize that lawyers, in some movements, act as core 
activists, rather than merely as professionals who serve the movement with 
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technical expertise.70 In the LGBT movement, lawyers, to a large extent, lead 
the movement.71 This is not to say that nonlawyer activists do not also play 
central roles or that lawyers do not coordinate strategy with other movement 
activists. Instead, I am merely reflecting the reality that lawyers at resource-
rich LGBT legal organizations play prominent roles in formulating and 
executing movement strategy. 
A. State-Based Legal Mobilization 
LGBT movement advocates have used a legal mobilization strategy to 
target individual states, but the state-based approach is part of a coordinated 
national strategy. Advocates pursue nationwide change by building progress 
state by state.72 After the initiation of the modern marriage-equality movement 
in Hawaii,73 lawyers at the main LGBT legal organizations attempted to cabin 
the issue of marriage equality at the state level. State courts have been key 
players, with the courts of Vermont74 and Massachusetts75 delivering 
significant victories early in the legal fight for relationship recognition. Since 
then, state courts in California,76 Connecticut,77 and Iowa78 have announced 
same-sex couples’ right to marry in sweeping terms, while other state courts 
 
 70 See, e.g., Barclay et al., supra note 37, at 11 (“Social movement theory is largely silent about lawyers 
who work with social movements. When lawyers appear in social movement studies, they are mostly 
characterized as hired guns who exhaust a movement’s scarce resources and who exert a conservatizing 
influence because of their apparent ‘elite’ status.” (citations omitted)); Jones, supra note 37, at 203–04 (“What 
is missing from these theoretical assumptions is the view of lawyers as ‘insiders’ or as rank-and-file 
activists.”). 
 71 See CARLOS A. BALL, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE COURTROOM: FIVE LGBT RIGHTS LAWSUITS THAT 
HAVE CHANGED OUR NATION 16 (Michael Bronski ed., 2010); Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 69, at 1240; 
Eskridge, supra note 38, at 466. 
 72 Other social movements have successfully adopted a state-based approach. See, e.g., PARIS, supra note 
25, at 2 (describing the state-based litigation campaign for educational rights after the movement’s loss at the 
U.S. Supreme Court); Justin R. Long, Demosprudence, Interactive Federalism, and Twenty Years of Sheff v. 
O’Neill, 42 CONN. L. REV. 585, 601–03 (2009) (describing the shift from federal to state litigation in the 
education context). Indeed, states historically have served as vital arenas for social movement mobilization and 
activism. See ELISABETH S. CLEMENS, THE PEOPLE’S LOBBY: ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF 
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1890–1925, at 65–67 (1997); Emily Zackin, Positive 
Constitutional Rights in the United States 9–10 (Nov. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton 
University) (on file with author). 
 73 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 74 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 75 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 76 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 77 See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). 
 78 See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
NEJAIME GALLEYS4 7/5/2012 2:02 PM 
2012] THE LEGAL MOBILIZATION DILEMMA 679 
have turned back same-sex couples’ claims.79 State legislatures, which 
generally worked against marriage equality early on, have more recently taken 
a leading role in relationship-recognition reform, with lawmakers in 
Vermont,80 New Hampshire,81 and New York82 passing marriage-equality 
legislation, and those in many other states codifying nonmarital-relationship 
recognition.83 The Council of the District of Columbia also passed a marriage-
equality law.84 
While some scholars have questioned the positive impact of marriage-
equality litigation,85 legal mobilization scholars tend to view the effects of such 
litigation in a positive light. Acknowledging that court decisions spurred 
significant backlash and led to important setbacks, these scholars nonetheless 
contend that litigation contributed in important ways to LGBT rights in a 
number of states across multiple domains.86 
In a careful and comprehensive analysis, Thomas Keck links the 
movement’s legal mobilization strategy to specific LGBT advances.87 He 
balances the regressive policy documented in more pessimistic accounts with 
progressive laws on relationship recognition adopted by a number of states and 
Washington, D.C., since the Hawaii litigation.88 Keck explicitly connects 
incremental reform to court-centered strategies, arguing that marriage litigation 
produced, rather than foreclosed, the very possibilities for nonmarital-
 
 79 See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); 
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (en banc). 
 80 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (West Supp. 2011). 
 81 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (Supp. 2011). 
 82 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney Supp. 2011). 
 83 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 201(a) (Supp. 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572B-2 (West 
Supp. 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-3.1-1(2) (Supp. 2012). 
 84 D.C. CODE § 46-401(a) (Supp. 2012). At the time this Article went to print, state lawmakers in 
Washington and Maryland had passed marriage-equality legislation, but opponents were attempting to block 
the laws through voter initiatives. See Aaron. C. Davis, Gay Marriage Bill Approved by Md. Senate, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 24, 2012, at A1; William Yardley, House Vote Moves Washington State Closer to Gay Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at A15. 
 85 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 415 
(2d ed. 2008); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 482 
(2005). 
 86 See, e.g., Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT 
Rights, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151, 167–82 (2009); see also ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS & 
INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 216–18 (2005); DANIEL R. 
PINELLO, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 192–93 (2006). 
 87 See Keck, supra note 86. 
 88 See id. at 169. 
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relationship-recognition regimes.89 In this view, litigation threatening marriage 
equality suddenly cast nonmarital recognition, including domestic-partnership 
and civil-union regimes, as a moderate, compromise position.90 Keck also 
balances legislative setbacks with legislative victories on a variety of LGBT 
issues.91 While the pace of anti-LGBT legislation picked up after key court 
victories, the pace of pro-LGBT legislation did as well, with many states 
passing antidiscrimination laws, hate-crime protections, and relationship-
recognition statutes.92 Public opinion tracks this progressive policy story, with 
polling data demonstrating increasing support among the general public for 
marriage equality and civil unions.93 
When viewed through the legal mobilization lens, it becomes clear that 
LGBT rights advocates used litigation to obtain tangible and immediate results 
for constituents while also seizing on the extrajudicial effects of court-based 
strategies. To reap these indirect benefits, advocates pursued litigation at the 
same time that they deployed a range of other tactics, which worked in 
conjunction with litigation.94 State-by-state legislative advocacy, in the shadow 
of marriage litigation, produced a variety of relationship-recognition regimes, 
ranging from designated beneficiaries to domestic partnerships, and civil 
unions to marriage. Some states that provided relationship rights to same-sex 
couples gradually expanded on those rights. For instance, after California 
enacted a fairly limited domestic-partnership scheme in 1999,95 the legislature 
added to the rights and benefits attached to the domestic-partnership status, 
 
 89 See id. at 158–59; accord MARTIN DUPUIS, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, LEGAL MOBILIZATION, & THE 
POLITICS OF RIGHTS 164 (2002). 
 90 See Keck, supra note 86, at 158–59; see also Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 69, at 1246. 
 91 See Keck, supra note 86, at 172 tbl.5. 
 92 See id. at 171–75 & tbl.6. 
 93 See id. at 165–67; see also Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning 
from Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1531–32 & n.285 
(2006). More recent polling bolsters this claim. See, e.g., Carol J. Williams, Polls May Sway Prop. 8 Case, 
L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2011, at AA4. 
 94 See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 69, at 1312–18. This is consistent with observations made 
about cause lawyers more generally. See Scott L. Cummings, Critical Legal Consciousness in Action, 120 
HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 67 (2007), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/cummings.pdf [hereinafter 
Cummings, Critical Legal Consciousness] (“[Public interest lawyers] operate across legal boundaries in a 
manner that suggests deep appreciation for the interplay between traditional legal activism and transformative 
political goals.”); Scott L. Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement’s Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of 
the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1927, 1979–84 (2007) (describing a model of “[m]ulti-[l]evel 
[l]egal [a]dvocacy”). 
 95 Act of Oct. 2, 1999, ch. 588, sec. 2, §§ 297–299.6, 1999 Cal. Stat. 4157, 4157–61 (codified as 
amended at CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297–299.6 (West Supp. 2012)). 
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making incremental shifts in 200196 and 2003,97 with the result of ultimately 
providing all of the state rights and benefits of marriage.98 Advocates defended 
the domestic-partnership law in court even as they litigated the issue of 
marriage equality.99 Moreover, some states providing the benefits and 
obligations of marriage under a nonmarital designation eventually provided 
marriage in name as well. Vermont100 and New Hampshire,101 for example, 
moved legislatively from a comprehensive civil-union statute to full marriage 
equality. Vermont’s change occurred after a special commission determined 
that civil unions, which were obtained through litigation, did not in fact 
provide equal treatment to same-sex couples in a variety of settings.102 
While litigation has produced important progress for the LGBT movement, 
lawyers for the movement recognize the risks and constraints of litigation and 
therefore approach courts with caution. They target states with favorable 
background conditions—pro-LGBT laws relating to antidiscrimination and 
parenting, potentially receptive judges and political leaders, and a difficult and 
lengthy process for amending the state constitution.103 For instance, lawyers at 
GLAD brought suit in Massachusetts after careful consideration and based on a 
number of favorable indicators.104 Massachusetts law protected lesbians and 
gay men from discrimination.105 The state’s high court had ruled favorably on 
the parental rights of same-sex couples.106 And constitutional initiatives in 
Massachusetts require a constitutional convention and passage by the 
legislature, rather than merely signature gathering by citizen groups.107 
 
 96 Act of Oct. 14, 2001, ch. 893, 2001 Cal. Stat. 7283. 
 97 California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003, ch. 421, sec. 4, §§ 297.5, 2003 
Cal. Stat. 1. 
 98 Id. For a more thorough analysis of the process from 1999 to 2003, see Grace Ganz Blumberg, Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal Relationships: The 2003 California Domestic Partner Rights and 
Responsibilities Act in Comparative Civil Rights and Family Law Perspective, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1555, 1558–
67 (2004). 
 99 See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 69, at 1287. 
 100 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (West Supp. 2011). 
 101 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (Supp. 2011). 
 102 See OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE VERMONT COMMISSION ON FAMILY 
RECOGNITION AND PROTECTION 26–27 (2008), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/WorkGroups/ 
FamilyCommission/VCFRP_Report.pdf. 
 103 See Douglas NeJaime, Convincing Elites, Controlling Elites, 54 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 175, 185–87, 
193–98 (2011) (comparing the strategic decision making in Massachusetts with that in California). 
 104 See Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 1, 8–21 (2005). 
 105 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, §§ 3–4 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 106 See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (approving second-parent adoption in the 
context of a same-sex couple). 
 107 MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. IV, §§ 2–5; see also Bonauto, supra note 104, at 21. 
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In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court held that excluding same-sex couples from marriage violated the 
state constitution.108 In a subsequent opinion, the court made clear that only 
full marriage rights would remedy the constitutional violation.109 As lead 
attorney Mary Bonauto explains, Goodridge changed the Massachusetts 
landscape governing LGBT rights and marriage equality.110 The decision 
mobilized movement members and altered the discussion in the state political 
arena.111 Political elites suddenly had a state court decision to justify their 
support for marriage equality, and opponents had to work to contravene a 
Supreme Judicial Court decision and to alter the meaning of previously 
announced constitutional rights.112 To avoid a constitutional amendment, 
LGBT rights advocates worked with sympathetic legislators to outmaneuver 
opponents and convince moderates to support the cause.113 Over time, support 
for marriage equality increased among elites and the general public. Now, 
several years after the marriage-equality regime initiated by the state supreme 
court generated intense controversy and division, marriage appears safe from 
attack.114 
While the Massachusetts litigation presents a promising picture of court-
centered change, LGBT rights lawyers have at times adopted a strategy of 
litigation avoidance based on the background institutional and political 
conditions. In California, for instance, advocates consistently advised against 
marriage litigation and instead pursued a legislative and public-education 
strategy in conjunction with more limited claims in court.115 Lawyers were 
concerned that, even if they could secure a state supreme court decision 
ordering marriage equality, a mobilized countermovement could reverse that 
result through the initiative process, which unlike in Massachusetts does not 
require legislative approval and moves very quickly. While movement lawyers 
were forced into litigation in California by events outside their control and 
ultimately prevailed at the California Supreme Court, their warnings proved 
 
 108 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 109 Ops. of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). 
 110 See Bonauto, supra note 104, at 31. 
 111 See id. at 53. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See id. at 53–54. 
 114 State leaders support marriage equality. See Complaint at 22–23, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-11156-JLT); Matt Viser, A Patrick 
Family Coming-Out, BOS. GLOBE, June 13, 2008, at A1. 
 115 See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 69, at 1251–1300. 
NEJAIME GALLEYS4 7/5/2012 2:02 PM 
2012] THE LEGAL MOBILIZATION DILEMMA 683 
correct when voters approved Proposition 8 to prohibit marriage for same-sex 
couples.116 
B. Federal Legal Mobilization 
As a key part of their cautious state-based litigation strategy, LGBT rights 
lawyers for many years attempted to keep controversies over relationship 
recognition away from federal judges. Their approach to federal courts, as 
compared to their initiation of litigation in select state courts, demonstrates that 
movement advocates see courts as important social-change agents at the same 
time that they recognize the risks of court-centered strategies given the position 
of courts in relation to other governmental actors and the public.117 Indeed, 
movement lawyers are especially wary of approaching the U.S. Supreme Court 
with the general question of marriage equality—as the Perry lawyers attempt 
to do—when conservatives dominate the federal bench, the laws of a majority 
of states do not allow same-sex couples to marry, and national public opinion 
is split.118 
Movement advocates are well aware of the risks of a Supreme Court loss. 
The 1980s witnessed perhaps the most devastating defeat for LGBT rights. In 
Bowers v. Hardwick, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Georgia’s antisodomy 
statute in a 5–4 decision at a time when twenty-five states still maintained such 
laws.119 The decision facilitated continued discriminatory treatment of lesbians 
and gay men. Lawyers struggled to argue that the U.S. Constitution prohibited 
sexual-orientation discrimination while allowing criminal prohibitions on the 
conduct understood to define the group.120 Consequently, LGBT rights lawyers 
looked in a more wholesale fashion to state courts and to state law claims.121 
They experienced considerable success, as eight of the eleven states 
 
 116 See id. at 1293–95. 
 117 Movement lawyers’ outlook on litigation resonates with Scott Cummings’ idea of “constrained 
legalism,” in which public interest lawyers “strategically deploy[] law in a way that is neither utopian in its 
hopes for legal reform nor rejectionist in its dismissal of legal avenues of transformation.” Cummings, Critical 
Legal Consciousness, supra note 94, at 63. 
 118 For a defense of a Supreme Court strategy on marriage equality, see Justin Driver, The Consensus 
Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 755 (2011). 
 119 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 120 See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“If the Court [in Bowers] was 
unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open to a lower 
court to conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious.”). But see Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (invalidating Colorado’s Amendment 2, which precluded sexual-orientation 
antidiscrimination protections, on equal protection grounds). 
 121 See, e.g., Boutcher, supra note 37, at 12. 
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decriminalizing sodomy after Bowers did so through judicial decisions.122 
LGBT rights advocates familiarized state court judges with the discrimination 
faced by lesbians and gay men, often in the context of antisodomy laws, and 
these judges began to understand the constitutional dimensions of such 
discrimination. State courts used state constitutional law to gradually expand 
LGBT rights.123 For instance, once a court found that the state constitution 
prohibited antisodomy laws, it might also find that lesbians and gay men 
deserved state-based parental rights or relationship recognition.124 
While LGBT rights lawyers have focused largely on state-based activism, 
they are not entirely averse to federal litigation. In fact, one of their most 
important victories occurred at the U.S. Supreme Court. Led by Lambda Legal, 
the movement prevailed in the landmark Lawrence v. Texas case, which struck 
down criminal prohibitions on sodomy.125 In overturning Bowers, Lawrence 
signified the vast progress of the movement over a period of less than twenty 
years. As a classic impact litigation victory, Lawrence rejected with one 
decision criminal prohibitions in thirteen states126 and removed a significant 
barrier to the achievement of other rights, namely those in the family and 
workplace. Doctrinally, arguments for increased scrutiny for sexual-
orientation-based classifications became more plausible, and the conduct–
status distinction that had long harmed lesbians and gay men began to erode. 
Crucially, though, the Lawrence effort built on state-based advances, using 
important state law victories to frame federal constitutional claims and 
convince the Court to reverse its earlier decision.127 
In light of movement developments post-Bowers and the long road from 
Bowers to Lawrence, it is unsurprising—even apart from the state law nature 
of marriage—that advocates turned exclusively to state courts and state law for 
 
 122 See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 
(Ky. 1992); Doe v. Ventura, No. MC 01-489, 2001 WL 543734 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 15, 2001); see also 
ANDERSEN, supra note 86, at 100–01; NeJaime, supra note 25, at 990–94. 
 123 See NeJaime, supra note 25, at 991–94. 
 124 See id. at 992–93. Montana provides an example of this trend. The Montana Supreme Court struck 
down the state’s antisodomy statute, see Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 126 (Mont. 1997), before ruling 
unconstitutional the state university’s policy offering insurance benefits to different-sex, but not same-sex, 
couples, see Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 452 (Mont. 2004). 
 125 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 126 See id. at 573, 578. 
 127 NeJaime, supra note 25, at 992. 
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relationship recognition.128 The favorable conditions that exist in many states 
contrast sharply with unfavorable federal law, including the Defense of 
Marriage Act129 (DOMA), and a conservative federal judiciary, including a 
sharply divided Supreme Court. 
But after working to stop federal DOMA suits by same-sex couples, the 
organized movement ultimately filed its own DOMA challenge in 2009. The 
carefully constructed and incremental federal litigation strategy targeting 
DOMA builds directly on significant state law advances. By leveraging state-
level change to challenge the federal government’s treatment of same-sex 
couples’ state law marriages, the DOMA strategy depends on and seeks to 
extend state-based victories.130 
GLAD’s suit, Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, launched the first 
orchestrated movement attack on DOMA and did so in a limited way.131 The 
suit targeted only section 3, which prohibits federal recognition of same-sex 
couples’ marriages, and specified a fairly limited range of federal rights at 
stake.132 Moreover, it addressed only Massachusetts married, same-sex 
couples, asking for a determination that DOMA was unconstitutional as 
applied to those couples.133 Accordingly, the suit attempted to take the first big 
bite out of DOMA, but it did so without directly affecting the issue of same-
sex marriage in most other states.134 
 
 128 See Michael McCann & Jeffrey Dudas, Retrenchment . . . and Resurgence?: Mapping the Changing 
Context of Movement Lawyering in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra 
note 25, at 37, 54. 
 129 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) and 1 U.S.C. § 7). 
Congress passed DOMA in 1996. Section 2 provides that states need not recognize marriages of same-sex 
couples from other states. Id. § 2. Section 3 prohibits the federal government from recognizing same-sex 
couples’ valid state law marriages. Id. § 3. 
 130 See Windsor v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 
F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 
10–2204, 10–2207, 10–2214, 2012 WL 1948017 (1st Cir. May 31, 2012); First Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10-1750-VLB (D. Conn. Jan. 
14, 2011); see also Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 
2010), aff’d, 2012 WL 1948017. 
 131 First Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief and for 
Review of Agency Action, Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (No. 09-10309-JLT) [hereinafter Gill Complaint]. 
 132 Id. at 5. The suit did not pursue broader and more complicated federal rights, such as those related to 
immigration. 
 133 Id. at 2, 5. 
 134 See David G. Savage, Gay Marriage Brick by Brick, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, at A13. 
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GLAD received a favorable decision from the district court.135 With this 
result in hand, GLAD filed an additional suit in federal district court in 
Connecticut on behalf of Connecticut, Vermont, and New Hampshire married, 
same-sex couples.136 On the same day, the ACLU filed a similar suit in federal 
district court in New York on behalf of New York married, same-sex 
couples.137 These lawsuits provided an opening for LGBT rights advocates to 
pressure the Obama Administration to make good on its commitment to end 
DOMA’s discriminatory treatment. While the Justice Department had been 
defending DOMA in Gill under a rational-basis theory,138 the new litigation 
offered an opportunity to contest the appropriate level of scrutiny for DOMA’s 
sexual-orientation-based classification because of the lack of Second Circuit 
precedent on the issue. Ultimately, the Obama Administration announced that 
such classifications merit heightened scrutiny under federal equal protection 
law and that section 3 of DOMA is accordingly unconstitutional.139 Prompted 
by the new Justice Department position, Lambda Legal launched a DOMA 
challenge on the West Coast: Its lawyers refiled an employee-benefits case in 
federal district court in California to explicitly challenge DOMA.140 
 
 135 See Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 377. Immediately before this Article went to print, the First Circuit 
affirmed that ruling. See Massachusetts, 2012 WL 1948017. 
 136 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10-1750-
VLB (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2010). 
 137 See Complaint, Windsor v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10-CV-08435 
(BSJ) (JCF)). 
 138 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 3, Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 
(No. 09-10309-JLT). 
 139 Defendant United States’ Memorandum of Law in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Intervenor’s Motion to Dismiss at 1, Windsor, 797 F. Supp. 2d 320 (No. 10-CV-08435 (BSJ) 
(JCF)); Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. 
The House of Representatives, through its Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, hired former Bush Solicitor 
General Paul Clement to intervene in defense of DOMA. See Memorandum of Law of Intervenor–Defendant 
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives in Opposition to Plaintiff’s 
Motion to Strike, Windsor, 797 F. Supp. 2d 320 (No. 10-CV-08435 (BSJ) (JCF)). In another case, a federal 
bankruptcy court adopted the Justice Department’s position in holding DOMA unconstitutional as applied to a 
married, California same-sex couple. In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 575–76, 579 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 140 See Second Amended Complaint at 1–2, Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 781 F. Supp. 2d 967 
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. C 10-00257 JSW). The district court recently found DOMA unconstitutional. See 
Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. C 10-00257 JSW, 2012 WL 569685, at *26 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 
2012). Across the country, Lambda Legal is attempting to leverage state law progress in neighboring states. 
Just days after New York lawmakers passed marriage-equality legislation, lawyers filed a lawsuit in New 
Jersey state court that presents both state and federal constitutional claims. See Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, Garden State Equal. v. Dow, No. L-001729-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 29, 2011). 
The suit highlights the common nature of travel between New York and New Jersey and argues that same-sex 
couples in civil unions in New Jersey are relegated to an inferior status compared to their neighbors in New 
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The recent initiation of federal litigation, perhaps paradoxically, highlights 
the centrality of state-based change. LGBT rights lawyers have focused for 
several years on achieving relationship recognition at the state level. Only 
when some states allowed same-sex couples to marry and support for 
marriage-equality laws had increased significantly (particularly in those states) 
did advocates attempt to leverage state law advances for federal gains. The 
DOMA suits build on, rather than contravene, the coordinated state-based 
strategy. Instead of challenging marriage restrictions generally or presenting 
claims on behalf of unmarried, same-sex couples, the suits directly depend on 
state law advances. Indeed, advocates invoke states’ traditional authority over 
marriage, arguing for federal deference to state law definitions.141 
The recent federal litigation also demonstrates the role of court-centered 
tactics in advocates’ arsenal and the position of courts in the broader political 
environment. Lawyers only pursued federal litigation when conditions at the 
state and federal levels, both inside and outside the courts, seemed favorable. 
With an increasingly receptive administration, more support for marriage 
equality from national political figures, and more states authorizing marriage 
for same-sex couples, lawyers could pursue DOMA litigation with more 
confidence that they could achieve a positive result in court and find adequate 
political support for that result. 
II. TACTICAL CONFLICT AND LITIGATION 
In this Part, I distinguish litigation from other institutional tactics to show 
how it is uniquely suited to individual attempts to control or redirect movement 
strategy. I then locate Perry in the trajectory of litigation threats to the LGBT 
movement’s coordinated, state-based legal mobilization approach. While 
movement lawyers have managed to minimize the impact of many unwanted 
lawsuits, Perry presents a new brand of litigation, featuring the support—from 
constituents, elites, and the courts—necessary to drive a large-scale suit. 
 
York. Id. at 2, 20–21. Indeed, a month after filing suit, Lambda Legal celebrated the first day of marriage for 
same-sex couples in New York by focusing on the New York–New Jersey disparity. See Press Release, 
Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal and Garden State Equality Celebrate Marriage in New York by Calling for 
Equality in New Jersey (July 24, 2011), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/nj_20110724_ 
calling-for-marriage.html. 
 141 See Gill Complaint, supra note 131, at 11; see also Complaint at 22, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-11156-JLT). 
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A. The Power of Litigation 
While other institutional tactics generally require substantial organizational 
strength, significant funds, and a relatively high degree of community 
consensus, one individual, with little money and no community support, can 
initiate litigation. Once commenced, a lawsuit can generate a substantial 
amount of publicity even if the movement actors staging it lack name 
recognition and the community goodwill associated with established 
organizations.142 Most importantly, one lawsuit, particularly with a Supreme 
Court resolution, can inflict tremendous legal and political damage. Of course, 
a single suit may also yield tremendous benefits. Win or lose, litigation is a 
high-stakes proposition. 
First, any movement member can get into court and can do so without 
community support or substantial material resources. The individualist model 
of litigation, embodied in both procedural and ethical rules, contrasts sharply 
with more democratic, consensus-based models that characterize group 
decision making in other institutional arenas.143 Procedural mechanisms allow 
an individual litigant to bring a claim that will affect the rights of a broad 
constituency.144 And ethical rules instruct a lawyer to loyally represent the 
particular client’s interest, with little consideration for the impact on other 
similarly situated group members.145 One eager group member, perhaps with 
one willing lawyer, can set the movement on a new course by filing a lawsuit 
that raises a claim impacting the entire group. Indeed, as Rubenstein argues, 
“In the shadow of this legal regime, group disputes are exacerbated and 
constituencies are disharmonized.”146 That is, the individualist model of 
litigation may provoke and heighten movement conflict. 
 
 142 Social movement work recognizes the importance of media coverage. See Jenkins, supra note 31, at 
546 (“Because mass media coverage is decisive in informing elites and mass publics about movement actions 
as well as in forming the morale and self-image of movement activists, the mass media are important actors in 
political conflicts.”). 
 143 See Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 1624–27. 
 144 See id. at 1644. 
 145 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2002) (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the 
client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”); id. R. 1.2(a) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . .”); id. R. 1.7(a) (defining conflicts of interest without 
mentioning the interests of other group members); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal 
Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 591 (1985); Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 1651–52. Indeed, ethical rules’ more 
recent concern for organizational clients has not led to sustained consideration of social movement groups as 
clients. 
 146 Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 1650. 
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Second, once commenced, litigation can garner significant attention.147 
Press outlets routinely report on new marriage lawsuits, even when no 
established organizations are behind them. For instance, recent suits in 
Minnesota148 and Wyoming,149 both of which emerged from outside the main 
movement channels, quickly received media coverage. With Perry, AFER has 
seized on the publicity generated by high-profile litigation (with high-profile 
lawyers). AFER representatives consistently appear on television and in print 
media.150 The 2010 trial generated tremendous media attention, both for the 
organization itself and the underlying cause.151 AFER continues to leverage the 
trial for publicity and fundraising purposes; for instance, AFER board member 
Dustin Lance Black has staged a play, performed by high-profile actors, based 
on the trial transcripts.152 
Finally, with judicial resolution as the endgame, litigation threatens to bind 
other movement members and produce a result that may substantially harm the 
movement. Other tactics, such as lobbying, public education, and direct action, 
do not pose the same danger as a lawsuit with the prospect of a definitive, 
governing court decision. In fact, direct-action tactics that movement leaders 
do not endorse may actually help the movement achieve its more moderate 
goals.153 But unlike disruptive protesters who may make LGBT rights litigators 
and legislative advocates seem more reasonable, unwanted marriage litigation 
 
 147 See MCCANN, supra note 5, at 58. 
 148 See Elizabeth Dunbar, Legal Fight to Lift Minnesota’s Gay Marriage Ban Faces Tough Odds, MINN. 
PUB. RADIO (June 3, 2010), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/06/03/fight-to-lift-gay-
marriage-ban-faces-tough-odds/. 
 149 See Jeremy Pelzer, Gay Marriage Lawsuit Worries Activists, TRIB.COM (Aug. 29, 2010, 1:34 AM), 
http://trib.com/news/local/article_20e70802-f2c2-52a1-b1e6-a0d7e8f89598.html. 
 150 AFER lists its extensive appearances on its website. See Press Coverage, AM. FOUND. FOR EQUAL 
RTS., http://www.afer.org/news/press-coverage/ (last visited July 5, 2012). 
 151 See, e.g., Maura Dolan, Proposition 8 Trial Turns Its Attention to Children, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2010, 
at A11; Michelle Quinn & Gerry Shih, Same-Sex Marriage Case, Day 8: Power and Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES: 
BAY AREA BLOG (Jan. 21, 2010, 4:43 PM), http://bayarea.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/same-sex-marriage-
case-day-8-power-and-prejudice/. 
 152 See Patrick Healy, Illuminating California’s Proposition 8 Trial, Onstage, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2011, 
at C3; Tina Daunt, George Clooney to Star in Dustin Lance Black’s Proposition 8 Play, HOLLYWOOD REP. 
(Dec. 13, 2011, 8:01 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/george-clooney-dustin-lance-black-prop-
8-marriage-equality-272999. 
 153 See, e.g., Herbert H. Haines, Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957–1970, 32 
SOC. PROBS. 31 (1984). 
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provides no foil to mainstream LGBT rights work. Instead, it simply represents 
a particular suit that movement leaders considered and rejected.154 
The possibility of damaging precedent, particularly in federal courts, raises 
the stakes of litigation relative to ill-advised legislative advocacy or direct 
action.155 Even if the lawsuit does not technically have preclusive effect, 
principles governing precedent and stare decisis bind courts that might 
consider the same claim (and thereby bind group members who might later 
raise that claim).156 Courts are reluctant to challenge settled authority, and of 
course, a Supreme Court decision exerts a particularly powerful influence on 
other courts.157 Stare decisis principles similarly constrain the Supreme Court, 
which generally reverses course only after several years.158 Indeed, the 
relatively short road from Bowers to Lawrence was still seventeen long years. 
A damaging precedent not only affects (and limits) social movement 
activity in the courts, it also influences other social-change tactics. In the wake 
of a Supreme Court loss on marriage equality, LGBT rights advocates would 
be forced back into state arenas.159 But unlike the post-Bowers context, in 
which advocates could appeal to state lawmakers and judges, they instead 
would face a number of state constitutional amendments that restrict change to 
the initiative process.160 Accordingly, advocates would have to return to state 
 
 154 See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 69, at 1298–1300. It is not that movement advocates think they 
would necessarily lose at the Supreme Court. Rather, they understand the risk of loss as significant, and they 
have balanced that risk against the success of their incremental, state-by-state strategy. 
 155 See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 27, at 66–70 (discussing the constraints inherent in legal advocacy 
because of the restrictive nature of precedent and stare decisis principles); cf. Burstein, supra note 33, at 1208 
(“[T]he justification for studying appellate cases is not in their being a random sample but rather in their great 
importance . . . .”). 
 156 See Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 1646 (“The outcome of the initial action, though not preclusive of 
future litigations, will be authoritative precedent governing them. Hence each initial lawsuit will infringe upon 
the freedom of other community members . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE § 1.2, at 21 (2d ed. 2009) (“When an appellate court makes a holding on a question of law, that 
holding is precedential. That means that it binds all lower courts within that judicial system on that question of 
law; no inferior court in that judicial system can take a different approach on that question of law.”). 
 157 See FREER, supra note 156, § 1.2, at 21 (“Obviously, decisions by the United States Supreme Court 
bind all courts in the United States, federal and state, on matters of federal law.”); see also Rubenstein, supra 
note 9, at 1647. 
 158 See FREER, supra note 156, § 1.2, at 21 (discussing examples showing that “stare decisis is not 
immutable” and that the Supreme Court may revisit earlier rulings when “relevant changes in law and society 
lead to the conclusion that precedent [should] be overturned”). 
 159 See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing: Life After Perry, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 28, 2011, 
6:00 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/03/winning-through-losing-life-after-perry.html. 
 160 See id. 
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ballot initiatives in the vast majority of states—an expensive and daunting 
proposition in most states.161 
Ultimately, litigation’s individualist quality differs substantially from other 
social-change tactics. The debate over an initiative to repeal Proposition 8 
provides a fitting illustration of the significant differences between litigation 
and other institutional tactics. One movement member can file a lawsuit and 
thereby redirect movement strategy and energy to a great extent. One 
individual, however, generally cannot dictate nonlitigation institutional tactics. 
After Proposition 8’s passage in 2008, lawyer and nonlawyer activists in 
California debated the merits of a repeal initiative, with various factions split 
between a 2010 and 2012 repeal effort.162 Without sufficient movement 
support and fundraising ability, the organizations backing a 2010 initiative 
failed to raise sufficient funds to fuel the signature-gathering campaign 
necessary to qualify the initiative for the ballot.163 
Recently, California activists renewed the initiative debate to determine 
whether they should seek to put a repeal proposition on the 2012 ballot.164 The 
most recent debate over a repeal effort took into account the Perry litigation, 
which at the time had been delayed on standing issues.165 Equality California, 
the state’s leading LGBT legislative advocacy organization, commenced an 
effort to gauge community sentiment on a ballot initiative.166 Unlike in the 
litigation context, where a single individual may end community debate and 
defy community consensus,167 Equality California’s effort recognized that a 
repeal initiative could not move forward without substantial support from 
community members, including major donors.168 The organization conducted a 
series of town-hall meetings, which featured leading LGBT activists.169 In 
these meetings, Equality California solicited input from movement constituents 
and polled attendees regarding a 2012 repeal effort.170 The organization also 
sent surveys to constituents, seeking their opinions on the wisdom and viability 
 
 161 See id. 
 162 See Carla Marinucci, Key Group to Push Repeal of Ban in ’12, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13, 2009, at D1. 
 163 See Maura Dolan, Prop. 8 Repeal Not on Ballot, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010, at AA5. 
 164 See Karen Ocamb, Equality California Town Hall in WeHo Split on Repealing Prop 8, LGBT POV 
(May 24, 2011), http://www.lgbtpov.com/2011/05/equality-california-town-hall-in-weho-split-on-repealing-
prop-8/. 
 165 See id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 See Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 1637–38. 
 168 See Ocamb, supra note 164. 
 169 See id. 
 170 See id. 
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of a 2012 ballot initiative.171 Because of the vast human and financial resources 
necessary to fuel an initiative campaign, Equality California asked survey 
participants whether they would “commit to volunteering with a campaign” 
and whether they would “provide financial support” for the campaign.172 
Recognizing the need for “major funders” in addition to broad-based 
community support,173 Equality California focused on whether individuals, 
foundations, and labor organizations could and would fund a campaign.174 
LGBT philanthropist Tim Gill noted that it would be “really silly” to start the 
initiative process without thinking through its financial viability.175 And major 
donor David Bohnett, who gave more than one million dollars to the “No on 8” 
campaign, reportedly said that public support for repeal would need to be 
around sixty percent in reliable polls before he would consider funding an 
initiative.176 Labor unions, which contributed substantially to the “No on 8” 
effort, expressed similar concerns.177 
Ultimately, Equality California announced that it would not pursue repeal 
in 2012.178 In its year-end report, the organization explained its decision: 
As we considered whether to go back to the ballot, we examined a 
number of factors, including input from supporters and movement 
leaders, the current political climate, other potential ballot measures 
that could impact a marriage campaign, whether a campaign could 
secure the necessary funding, the capacity of the movement to 
execute a campaign, current public support for marriage in 
California, the risks and impact of a potential ballot measure loss, the 
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Perry v. Brown legal challenge to Proposition 8 and many more 
factors.179 
Specifically pointing to the expensive nature of a repeal initiative, Equality 
California noted that “we could not win without access to significant funding; 
the cost of a campaign could exceed $40 million.”180 
In the end, a Proposition 8 repeal initiative requires significant support 
from the community, both for volunteers and funds, as well as substantial 
support from LGBT donors and allies. Unlike litigation, it is virtually 
impossible for one individual to break from the group and single-handedly 
undertake an initiative campaign in California. 
Equality California’s explanation of its decision not to pursue repeal also 
illustrates the interaction between litigation and other movement tactics, 
specifically showing how litigation, even without community consensus, can 
redirect movement strategy.181 A lawsuit may divert resources and political 
energy away from other tactics, including those that might enjoy greater 
community support.182 With the initial post-Proposition 8 repeal debate 
focused on a decision between 2010 and 2012, the underlying assumption 
seemed to be that, in the absence of a 2010 effort, the movement would pursue 
a 2012 campaign.183 But movement advocates in California were forced to put 
aside their repeal effort because attention and resources had shifted to the 
Perry litigation. An initiative would struggle to attract the necessary funding 
when a lawsuit seems poised to achieve the same result. Advocates revisited a 
potential ballot initiative only when the Perry litigation was sidetracked to the 
California Supreme Court on standing issues.184 Even then, it became clear that 
a repeal effort would likely not garner the required resources while the 
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litigation continued.185 As Equality California explained, “[T]he Perry v. 
Brown legal challenge to Proposition 8 has provided hope that the freedom to 
marry can be restored in California and create a legal precedent to protect 
marriage without the potential risks and expense of a multi-million dollar 
campaign in these very trying economic times.”186 
B. Lawsuits Challenging Coordinated Movement Strategy 
Strategic choices are often hotly contested within movements.187 While 
LGBT rights advocates have relied on a fairly coherent and unified strategy,188 
they have not been immune to internal tactical disputes or to challenges 
emerging from outside the movement leadership.189 Unwanted lawsuits have 
represented some of the most potent and dangerous strategic challenges. 
Movement advocates, including lawyers and nonlawyers, have responded in 
ways that attempt to limit the negative potential of such litigation. 
Throughout the course of the LGBT movement, advocates have confronted 
constituents and lawyers contravening movement strategy and pressing 
marriage claims in court. In fact, the early-1990s Hawaii litigation that initiated 
the modern marriage-equality movement began against the advice of LGBT 
rights lawyers and was driven by same-sex couples and their private 
attorney.190 As compared to the Perry litigation, it was less well-resourced and 
brought at a time when the political environment was generally unfavorable. It 
was also brought in state court under state law, thus limiting its doctrinal 
reach.191 Same-sex couples in Hawaii sought representation by Lambda Legal 
and the ACLU, but both organizations declined, believing such a suit was 
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premature.192 The couples retained a private attorney, Bill Woods, to represent 
them, but Woods withdrew at the urging of movement lawyers.193 Their second 
attorney, Dan Foley, moved forward with the case.194 Lambda Legal’s Evan 
Wolfson, unable to convince his organization to have a formal role in the 
litigation until after the state supreme court decision, informally advised 
Woods as the case made its way up the appellate chain.195 
In an unexpected ruling, the Hawaii Supreme Court ordered the trial court, 
on remand, to subject the marriage law’s different-sex requirement to strict 
scrutiny under the state constitution, based on the law’s sex-based 
classification.196 In response, Hawaii voters passed a constitutional amendment 
authorizing the legislature, which had already voted to reserve marriage for 
different-sex couples, to resolve the issue.197 Congress passed DOMA to 
prohibit federal marriage recognition and to authorize the states to refuse to 
recognize same-sex marriages from other states.198 All of this was done before 
a single same-sex couple in the United States had a legally valid marriage. One 
lawsuit, brought by a few same-sex couples with representation by a single, 
private-practice lawyer, substantially altered the course of the LGBT 
movement and single-handedly changed the national conversation on LGBT 
rights. In addition to producing important effects that would drive the 
marriage-equality campaign, this one lawsuit fueled a powerful 
countermovement response to limit the rights of same-sex couples, both at the 
state and federal levels.199 
Ever since the Hawaii litigation, challenges to coordinated movement 
strategy on marriage have plagued movement leadership.200 Same-sex couples 
have contravened the movement’s state-by-state strategy by litigating either in 
unfavorable states or in federal court. I will address each type of lawsuit 
separately because they pose varying degrees of risk and reward. 
Some same-sex couples have filed state court suits arguing that state 
marriage restrictions violate state constitutional law. To the dismay of 
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movement advocates, these suits have sprung up in states with hostile 
judiciaries, unfavorable laws, inhospitable legislatures, and generally 
unsympathetic voters. For instance, recent litigation in Minnesota201 prompted 
advocates there to publicly express disapproval of the procedural tactic while 
underscoring their substantive agreement with the plaintiffs’ claims. A new 
organization, Marry Me Minnesota, was formed for the purpose of filing a 
lawsuit challenging Minnesota’s statutory marriage restriction.202 The state’s 
established LGBT advocacy organizations responded by urging constituents to 
avoid litigation in the state; these groups relied on statements by leading 
national groups, including Lambda Legal, the ACLU, and NCLR, outlining the 
dangers of litigation in most states.203 The Minnesota Supreme Court had 
already rejected a federal marriage claim in the 1970s during the first wave of 
same-sex-marriage litigation.204 Advocates feared that the current Minnesota 
Supreme Court, with many justices nominated by Republican Governor Tim 
Pawlenty, would adapt the earlier decision’s reasoning to the state 
constitutional claims and thereby give the earlier decision renewed force.205 
Furthermore, activists feared that a marriage suit would provoke conservative 
legislators and other countermovement forces.206 Their fears were warranted: 
the legislature, under Republican control, advanced a constitutional 
amendment banning same-sex marriage.207 If voters approve the amendment 
and thereby constitutionalize a ban that had been only a matter of statutory 
law, LGBT rights advocates will have a more difficult time making legislative 
progress on relationship recognition. 
Yet for all the costs posed by ill-advised state court suits asserting 
exclusively state constitutional claims, such suits remain relatively cabined. 
While they may be damaging in the state, as both a doctrinal and a political 
matter, unfavorable decisions do not dictate other states’ doctrinal 
interpretations and do not threaten a Supreme Court decision on marriage. 
Accordingly, advocates express substantially more concern with federal 
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litigation than with state litigation. Federal suits evoke greater anxiety because 
such suits pose more precedential significance and are less cabined doctrinally 
and politically. 
Same-sex couples have brought federal challenges both to state marriage 
restrictions and to DOMA. By asserting federal constitutional claims on behalf 
of same-sex couples, these suits threaten far-reaching precedent and Supreme 
Court review. Some of these challenges have been filed in particularly 
unfavorable jurisdictions, such as in states with no valid, state law marriages of 
same-sex couples and in generally conservative federal circuits.208 
Lawyers at LGBT legal organizations have derailed these unwanted 
lawsuits with some success. If they are not able to convince the lawyers or 
parties to forego litigation,209 they may attempt to participate formally in the 
case. Such participation allows the movement lawyers to explain to the court 
how and why it can avoid a ruling on the merits. In Smelt v. County of Orange, 
a California same-sex couple sued in federal district court after they were 
denied a marriage license.210 The court confronted significant threshold 
questions, including whether the plaintiffs, who were not married under 
California state law, had standing to challenge DOMA211 and whether the 
federal court should abstain from deciding the constitutionality of California’s 
marriage restriction while the state courts were considering the same 
question.212 The district court held that the plaintiffs could challenge section 3 
of DOMA and rejected the federal constitutional claims on the merits.213 The 
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plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, at which point NCLR and Lambda 
Legal, representing Equality California, moved to intervene.214 The interveners 
claimed the Ninth Circuit should not consider the merits, arguing that the 
district court “erred in refusing to abstain as to the entire proceeding” and in 
finding that the plaintiffs “had standing to challenge section 3 of DOMA.”215 
The Ninth Circuit accepted both the standing and abstention arguments,216 thus 
foreclosing a substantive Ninth Circuit opinion and potential Supreme Court 
review.217 Ultimately, movement advocates successfully avoided an appellate 
ruling on the merits in a case riddled with substantive and procedural 
problems. Even when successful, though, participation in federal litigation for 
the purpose of preventing a substantive ruling requires significant movement 
resources and energy. 
C. The Perry Litigation 
In the wake of Proposition 8’s passage, LGBT movement leadership, 
including movement lawyers, urged constituents to avoid federal litigation.218 
After they unsuccessfully challenged Proposition 8 in the California Supreme 
Court in Strauss v. Horton—in which they argued that the initiative constituted 
a revision, rather than an amendment, to the California Constitution219—
California advocates again encouraged movement members to avoid a federal 
lawsuit and instead to work through the state political system to achieve 
marriage equality. In a joint statement, they argued that the movement “need[s] 
to go back to the voters.”220 Noting that “it is tempting to at least try a federal 
lawsuit first,” they claimed that litigation is “a temptation we should resist.”221 
Yet Chad Griffin, a gay political strategist, had formed a new organization, 
AFER, to initiate just such a lawsuit. AFER announced the Perry filing soon 
 
 214 See Opening Brief of Proposed Intervenor Equality California, Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 
673 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-56040). 
 215 Id. at 3. 
 216 See Smelt, 447 F.3d at 686. 
 217 At the end of 2008, the couple in the earlier Smelt federal litigation filed a state court challenge to 
DOMA, which was removed to federal court. The court eventually dismissed the suit on jurisdictional 
grounds. See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 7, Smelt v. United States, No. SACV 09-00286 
DOC (MLGx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2009). 
 218 See ACLU ET AL., MAKE CHANGE, NOT LAWSUITS (2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/lgbt/ 
camarriage_joint_20080609.pdf. 
 219 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 220 ACLU ET AL., supra note 3, at 1. 
 221 Id. 
NEJAIME GALLEYS4 7/5/2012 2:02 PM 
2012] THE LEGAL MOBILIZATION DILEMMA 699 
after the Strauss decision.222 Griffin, along with lawyer Ted Olson, had 
previously approached advocates at the leading California LGBT rights 
organizations.223 Those organizations refused to pursue the case, warning that 
such a strategy was simply too risky.224 Later, in a letter to leading LGBT 
rights lawyers, Griffin highlighted the tactical conflict, noting that, “[i]n public 
and private, you have made it unmistakably clear that you strongly disagree 
with our legal strategy.”225 AFER moved forward with the litigation on its 
own, with legal representation by Olson and his famous former adversary 
David Boies.226 
While movement lawyers originally decided not to intervene directly in the 
litigation, their decision changed when the Olson–Boies team resisted District 
Judge Walker’s push for an evidentiary hearing.227 AFER opposed the motion 
to intervene and worried about the ramifications of the movement lawyers’ 
involvement: “Having gone to such great lengths to dissuade us from filing suit 
and to tar this case in the press, it seems likely that your misgivings about our 
strategy will be reflected—either subtly or overtly—in your actions in 
court.”228 The court denied the motion to intervene,229 but the motion, to some 
extent, increased the Olson–Boies team’s receptiveness to a full trial.230 
Without a formal role in the litigation, lawyers at LGBT legal organizations 
influenced the case through amicus briefing231 and behind-the-scenes advice.232 
Ultimately, LGBT movement lawyers and AFER attempted to put their 
disagreements behind them because, as long as the suit was moving forward, 
both wanted it to succeed.233 
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Unlike earlier challenges, the Perry litigation features a well-resourced and 
professionalized organization—with strong constituent support, substantial 
fundraising capabilities, and top-notch legal representation—that can sustain 
and drive such a large-scale case. These factors make it more difficult to stop 
the case yet also increase the potential upside of the litigation. Movement 
lawyers are confident in the ability of AFER’s legal team, which boasts 
extensive trial and Supreme Court experience.234 They also know that AFER 
and its lawyers are determined to reach the Supreme Court, specifically on the 
question of same-sex couples’ federal constitutional right to marry. While the 
Perry suit was sidetracked on standing issues, AFER suggested that, if the case 
ended without a Supreme Court decision on the merits, the group would pursue 
another lawsuit.235 
The next Part analyzes how exactly the Perry litigation materialized and 
what role the movement’s successful legal mobilization strategy played. 
Despite the prevalence of internal disagreement over litigation strategy, this 
phenomenon has received relatively scant attention in the scholarly literature 
on both legal mobilization and social movements.236 Legal mobilization 
scholars have analyzed the possibilities and limitations of court-centered 
strategies, but they have not provided sustained analysis of litigation-based 
expressions of tactical conflict. Social movement scholars have explored 
important conflicts emerging from both inside and outside movements. They 
have demonstrated that countermovement threats divert resources and force 
movement responses while also benefiting the movement organizationally.237 
And they have documented the radical flank effect, observing that radical 
challenges within movements may benefit the more moderate movement 
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factions by increasing their legitimacy, resources, and access to power.238 Yet 
social movement scholars largely have neglected litigation and legal 
mobilization and have not explored the type of movement conflict addressed 
here.239 The movement actors share the goal of marriage equality but disagree 
on tactics, specifically temporal considerations regarding a federal-litigation 
strategy. 
III.  LEGAL MOBILIZATION’S CHANNELING EFFECTS ON TACTICAL CONFLICT 
A movement using a legal mobilization strategy can, in one sense, be too 
successful for its own good, especially when tactical disagreement arises. 
Successful legal mobilization may channel tactical contestation into litigation: 
By laying the groundwork for constituent mobilization, elite support, and 
receptive courts, legal mobilization may provoke especially powerful lawsuits 
that threaten and destabilize the strategic plans of other movement actors.240 
Using a typology gleaned from legal mobilization scholarship,241 I separate 
out effects that are internal and external to the movement. I argue that legal 
mobilization helped to create the conditions both inside and outside the LGBT 
movement that opened space for AFER’s litigation-driven challenge to 
coordinated movement strategy and control. The internal/external typology I 
use in significant ways tracks social movement theory’s three major theoretical 
frameworks, which provide key insights for understanding the legal 
mobilization dilemma.242 First, the resource mobilization approach focuses on 
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structural factors within movements and yet relates movement functioning to 
how movement actors and organizations attract and mobilize external 
resources, including elite support and funding.243 Next, the political process 
model shifts attention toward the interaction of internal and external conditions 
for movement progress; mobilization and organizational capacity allow the 
movement to exploit structural governmental features and seize on changing 
political alignments to advance its cause.244 Finally, framing theory reflects the 
cultural turn in sociology by drawing attention to movement actors’ 
interpretive choices and the strategic and constitutive effects of those 
choices.245 In framing issues, social movement actors mobilize constituents and 
construct movement identity (internal effects),246 and make their case to elites 
and the general public (external effects).247 
All three social movement perspectives shed light on the Perry litigation 
and the legal mobilization dilemma that it illustrates. While social movement 
work has left litigation undertheorized,248 such work helps to explain the 
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capacities to gather resources, and affect the efficacy of their use of those resources once gathered.”). Political 
process theory in social movement scholarship is not to be confused with political process work in 
constitutional theory. For an explanation of the latter, see Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process 
Theory Through the Lens of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1370–72 (2011). 
 245 See David A. Snow et al., supra note 31, at 464 (“By frame alignment, we refer to the linkage of 
individual and SMO [social movement organization] interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual 
interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary.”); see 
also Pedriana, supra note 37, at 1721 (“[T]he process through which movements mobilize ‘symbols, claims, 
and even identities in the pursuit of activism’ is generally known as framing.” (citations omitted) (quoting 
Williams, supra note 243, at 93)); Williams, supra note 243, at 93 (discussing framing theory). 
 246 See Williams, supra note 243, at 94 (discussing the internal effect of framing on movement culture). 
 247 See Shauna Fisher, It Takes (at Least) Two to Tango: Fighting with Words in the Conflict over Same-
Sex Marriage, in QUEER MOBILIZATIONS: LGBT ACTIVISTS CONFRONT THE LAW, supra note 28, at 207, 208 
(discussing the external effect of social movement framing). 
 248 See Pedriana, supra note 37, at 1721–22 (“[L]aw and legal institutions have not been central 
components of social movement theory . . . .”). 
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positive impact of litigation strategies at the same time that it points to 
litigation’s channeling effects.249 That all three perspectives contribute, in 
essential ways, to an understanding of the legal mobilization dilemma suggests 
that major insights from each perspective are crucial to theorizing social 
movements.250 Indeed, viewing social movement theory through the lens of 
legal mobilization uncovers the relationships among the resource mobilization, 
political process, and framing perspectives. An analysis of Perry shows that 
the boundaries among mobilizing structures, political opportunities, and frames 
blur as social movements interact and overlap with elite allies, the general 
public, the media, and the state. 
More specifically, this Part relies on social movement concepts to identify 
the effects produced by legal mobilization that facilitated AFER’s strategic 
contestation, channeled that contestation into litigation, and rendered that 
litigation threatening to other movement actors’ coordinated strategy. First, as 
to activity within the movement, court-centered strategies mobilized 
constituents around the central issue of marriage equality, which had been 
framed largely in constitutional, rights-based terms. This mobilization 
encouraged organizational founding aimed at marriage equality and wedded to 
increasingly institutional tactics; in AFER’s case, the organization focuses 
solely on the legal right to marry and does so through litigation. Second, as to 
changes outside the movement, successful legal mobilization mainstreamed 
marriage equality, increasing the salience of the issue and convincing state and 
private elites to support same-sex couples’ right to marry. Elite support in 
particular allowed movement constituents to find new resources with which to 
pursue marriage equality. Furthermore, successful legal mobilization produced 
a more open and favorable political opportunity structure, in which courts and 
legal actors play central roles. New movement organizations and activists seize 
on the increasing number of state actors—including government officials and 
federal judges—sympathetic to marriage equality and use doctrinal 
developments to encourage those state actors to advance the cause. 
 
 249 Some sociolegal scholars have used social movement insights to shed light on cause lawyering and 
legal mobilization. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 37, at 165–68 (contextualizing the discussion of litigation’s 
possibilities within the social movement literature on the demobilizing and deradicalizing effects of 
institutional and conventional tactics); Meili, supra note 37, at 121 (using the political process model to 
analyze consumer cause lawyering). 
 250 See MCADAM, supra note 242, at vii (attempting to reconcile the three leading social movement 
perspectives); Jenkins, supra note 31, at 527 (identifying “[a] multifactored model of social movement 
formation . . . , emphasizing resources, organization, and political opportunities”). 
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A. Marriage-Equality Mobilization 
1. Mobilizing Around the Legal Right to Marry 
Marriage-equality litigation mobilized constituents and raised 
consciousness around marriage as a legal, rights-based issue.251 This 
mobilization has contributed to significant positive developments, including 
greater movement momentum and increased financial support. Yet at the same 
time that the legal fight for marriage equality—and particularly the back-and-
forth movement–countermovement battle in California—increased the salience 
of the issue among movement constituents, it contributed to a narrowing effect 
on movement goals and tactics.252 
While legal frames have been marginalized in social movement work, law 
and legal symbols serve as important frames for social movement actors.253 
Law functions as a “master frame,”254 and rights-based discourse has particular 
appeal for social movement advocates.255 As Amy Kapczynski observes in her 
 
 251 Cf. Barclay et al., supra note 37, at 9 (“Law can . . . shape the experiences of movement activists and 
constituents. The articulation of these experiences using legal categories, most notably ‘rights,’ and the use of 
legal strategies can shape the collective experience of members and constituencies of social movements.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 252 See HULL, supra note 200, at 56 (noting that some lesbians and gay men see the issue of same-sex-
relationship recognition as part of the evolution of the movement while others see it as an assimilationist 
trend). 
 253 ANDERSEN, supra note 86, at 24; Bernstein et al., supra note 28, at 1; Pedriana, supra note 37, at 1724; 
cf. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
8 (1983) (“Law is a resource in signification . . . .”). 
 254 Pedriana, supra note 37, at 1725; David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and Cycles of 
Protest, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 133, 139 (Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller 
eds., 1992); accord JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERESTS: BEYOND THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 2–3 
(1996) (explaining the importance of legal language and practices to movement activity); PARIS, supra note 
25, at 25 (“Legal ideas and doctrines can structure politics in [the] first place by setting the terms of political 
debate and parameters of action, and they can provide discursive resources for reshaping meanings.”); 
Kapczynski, supra note 38, at 816–18 (discussing the framing power of law and legal symbols). Here, the 
insights from legal mobilization and cause lawyering scholarship find common ground with constitutional 
theory. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 36, at 1078 (“[T]he movement from ordinary politics to 
constitutional politics is seamless, for many Americans have little idea of the exact contours of constitutional 
doctrine and tend to associate the Constitution with whatever they regard as most right and just.”). 
 255 See Barclay et al., supra note 37, at 3 (“[L]aw provides a symbolically rich medium that social 
movements use to construct and to circulate meaning both within the movement and in their relations with 
actors outside the movement.”); Eskridge, supra note 38, at 422 (“[L]aw helped define the contours of the 
minority group itself, gave the group both incentives and forums in which to resist their stigmas, and provided 
dramatic events and campaigns that helped turn a reform movement into a mass social movement.”); Douglas 
NeJaime, Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition: Accounting for Differences Based on Religion and 
Sexual Orientation, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 303, 319–24 (2009) (demonstrating the power of rights claims 
for both the LGBT rights and Christian Right movements). 
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insightful use of framing theory in legal scholarship, legal language allows 
“social actors to frame problems and solutions in particular ways and to ‘align’ 
their frames with those used by potential adherents and bystanders.”256 Frames 
are important not merely at the mobilization stage but also as the movement 
makes demands on the state and attempts to attract support from elites and the 
general public.257 
LGBT advocates framed marriage equality as a basic legal (and 
constitutional) right.258 And the legal right to marry came to embody the more 
general quest for LGBT equality,259 which had long been demanded in the 
language of rights.260 As Nancy Polikoff has shown, legal recognition of same-
sex couples’ marriages, rather than other family law solutions, became the 
remedy to the unequal treatment of lesbians and gay men and their families.261 
Advocates linked their marriage claims to the myriad legal rights and benefits 
connected to marriage.262 
The legal right to marry also became a powerful marker of social and 
cultural equality. Once a state like California offered the state law rights of 
marriage through a domestic-partnership regime, marriage itself became a 
cultural symbol of full equality.263 As sociologist Kathleen Hull has 
demonstrated, lesbians and gay men connect legal relationship recognition to 
 
 256 Kapczynski, supra note 38, at 814; accord Anna-Maria Marshall, Injustice Frames, Legality, and the 
Everyday Construction of Sexual Harassment, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 659, 663 (2003); Pedriana, supra note 
37, at 1728. Legal scholar Samuel Bagenstos also relies on framing theory to explore the success of the 
“independence frame” in both unifying the disability rights movement and appealing to conservatives as 
potential movement allies. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 38, at 27–32. 
 257 See Meyer & Staggenborg, supra note 187, at 214 (“Demands are necessarily framed[] and targeted at 
authorities or opponents . . . .”). 
 258 See Fisher, supra note 247, at 218 (showing empirically that marriage-equality proponents 
predominantly “frame same-sex marriage using the language of rights”). 
 259 As Shannon Gilreath puts it, “Once upon a time there was a Movement . . . then there was Marriage.” 
Shannon Gilreath, Rebuttal, Arguing Against Arguing for Marriage, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 28, 35 
(2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Marriage.pdf. As William Eskridge argues, a strategy based 
on constitutional rights claims “empowers the movement, moderates over the radicals, and channels the 
movement’s discourse in assimilative directions.” Eskridge, supra note 38, at 423. 
 260 See BRIGHAM, supra note 254, at 50. 
 261 See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER 
THE LAW 107–09 (2008). 
 262 See id. at 100–07. 
 263 See HULL, supra note 200, at 116 (“[S]ome people in same-sex relationships assign a unique cultural 
power to the law of the state, the power to render their relationships socially normal and culturally equal to the 
commitments of married heterosexual couples.” (citation omitted)). 
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the cultural acceptance of same-sex relationships.264 The legal and cultural 
dimensions are so intertwined that the legal fight for marriage also signifies the 
push for social equality.265 
In California specifically, the issue of marriage equality was framed and 
debated largely in legal and constitutional terms. Courts adjudicated 
constitutional rights claims, and other governmental branches weighed in on 
marriage equality in specifically constitutional language. In February 2004, 
San Francisco’s mayor, Gavin Newsom, began issuing marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples based on his interpretation of the California constitution’s 
equal protection guarantee.266 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s 
Goodridge decision, which declared a state constitutional right for same-sex 
couples to marry, and President Bush’s subsequent call for a federal 
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage motivated Newsom.267 
The California Supreme Court stopped Newsom and invalidated the marriages 
licensed up to that point, but the court reserved the constitutional question of 
marriage equality for subsequent litigation.268 The constitutional issue worked 
its way through the state courts, ending with a California Supreme Court 
decision holding that same-sex couples enjoy a fundamental right to marry 
under the state constitution and that the state’s separate domestic-partnership 
system violated equal protection principles.269 The state constitutional right to 
 
 264 See id. at 126 (“Although rights and equality were important ways of talking about the value of legal 
marriage, study participants were just as likely to talk about it in the language of social legitimacy and 
validation.”); accord Kimberly D. Richman, By Any Other Name: The Social and Legal Stakes of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 357, 372 (2010) (discussing how legal recognition of marriage for same-sex 
couples served as social validation). 
 265 See HULL, supra note 200, at 148 (“[M]ost study participants who perceived symbolic benefits flowing 
from state recognition of same-sex marriage assumed a causal relationship between official law and broader 
social beliefs and attitudes.”); see also Mary Bernstein, The Contradictions of Gay Ethnicity: Forging Identity 
in Vermont, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: IDENTITY, CULTURE, AND THE STATE, supra note 242, at 85, 103 
(“Whereas both internal and external processes influence the construction of identity and identity politics, it is 
also the result of activists’ strategic responses to interactions with the law, the state, and other social 
movements.”); Jane S. Schacter, Skepticism, Culture and the Gay Civil Rights Debate in a Post-Civil-Rights 
Era, 110 HARV. L. REV. 684, 687 (1997) (reviewing ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN 
ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY (1995), and URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING 
OF GAY AND LESBIAN LIBERATION (1995)) (emphasizing the relationship between law and culture in the gay-
rights context). 
 266 Sylvia A. Law, Who Gets to Interpret the Constitution?: The Case of Mayors and Marriage Equality, 
3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 6 (2007). 
 267 Id. at 5. 
 268 Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004). 
 269 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401–02 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
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marry, as interpreted by the court, included not only substantive rights and 
benefits but also equal respect and dignity for family relationships.270 
In May 2008, lesbians and gay men in California celebrated the state 
supreme court’s Marriage Cases decision, and roughly 18,000 California 
same-sex couples married in its wake.271 At the same time, the movement 
campaigned against Proposition 8, which sought to amend the state 
constitution to prohibit marriage for same-sex couples. The state supreme 
court’s decision directly influenced how the ballot initiative was presented to 
voters.272 Attorney General Jerry Brown redrafted the initiative title to make 
clear that it “eliminated” an existing constitutional right.273 
Proposition 8 directed a huge supply of movement resources and 
constituent attention toward the marriage-equality issue in California. 
Individuals, organizations, and corporations around the country poured more 
than forty million dollars into the “No on 8” campaign.274 The “Yes on 8” 
campaign also spent roughly forty million dollars,275 and the initiative passed 
with fifty-two percent of the vote.276 Proposition 8 formally amended the equal 
protection clause of the California constitution to exclude the right to marry for 
same-sex couples. A subsequent state court challenge—in which movement 
lawyers argued that Proposition 8 constituted a revision, rather than an 
amendment, to the state constitution—failed.277 
The entire debate in California had been framed around the constitutional 
right to marry—from Mayor Gavin Newsom’s constitutional interpretation and 
reliance on Goodridge, to the state court litigation, to the Proposition 8 
initiative and subsequent state court challenge. Even now, efforts in California 
aim to restore the legal right to marry for same-sex couples by either altering 
the state constitution to repeal section 7.5 or convincing the federal courts to 
invalidate the amendment under the U.S. Constitution. 
 
 270 Id. at 401. 
 271 Jesse McKinley, Same-Sex Married Couples in California Await Court’s Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 
2009, at A10. 
 272 Cf. Ziegler, supra note 38, at 285 (“[A] blockbuster decision may also encourage officials and social 
movement leaders to focus on the result and justification offered by the court.”). 
 273 Bob Egelko, Judge Refuses to Order Change in Prop. 8 Title—Backers File Appeal, S.F. CHRON., 
Aug. 9, 2008, at B1. 
 274 Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 69, at 1294. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. at 1295; Maloy Moore, Tracking the Money: Final Numbers, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2009, 6:21 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-moneymap,0,2198220.htmlstory. 
 277 Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
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The fact that California same-sex couples were able to marry after the 
landmark Marriage Cases decision only to later see that right taken away by 
the voters may have highlighted the deprivation of the right and made the sense 
of loss more acute. The aftermath of Proposition 8 witnessed a significant 
outpouring of constituent outrage and increased mobilization.278 This 
mobilization was aimed primarily at the legal right to marry—only one of 
many movement priorities. Rallies around California focused on marriage 
equality, and activists led boycotts of businesses that contributed to the “Yes 
on 8” campaign. The leading LGBT legislative advocacy group in the state, 
Equality California, set to determining when repeal efforts would be viable.279 
The intensity surrounding marriage equality did not end at California’s 
borders. In cities around the country, lesbians and gay men and their supporters 
rallied for the legal right to marry.280 While the marriage issue had become a 
leading LGBT priority in the years preceding Proposition 8, the intense battle 
in California brought the marriage-equality debate to a fever pitch. And while 
LGBT activism featured grassroots efforts and direct action, such activism 
targeted the legal right to marry as the key to LGBT equality and did so in the 
specific language of constitutional rights.281 
Even though marriage litigation played a crucial role in mobilizing the 
movement around the legal right to marry, it is important to emphasize that a 
range of factors have made marriage the primary issue. The increasing 
centrality of marriage is not simply the result of calculated decision making by 
movement leadership or of constituent consensus. In fact, much of the 
California marriage litigation was driven by elite allies and countermovement 
forces, rather than by internal movement activity.282 Internal and external 
drivers interact in powerful ways. As I discuss in Part III.B, the mainstreaming 
of LGBT rights and buy-in by private and public elites narrowed the range of 
possible goals and increased attention on a generally acceptable priority.283 In 
essence, elites channeled movement activity toward more moderate and 
 
 278 See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 69, at 1296. 
 279 Press Release, Equal. Cal., Equality California Announces Community Town Halls, Polling to Discuss 
Possible Repeal of Prop 8 in 2012 (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://www.eqca.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2. 
aspx?c=kuLRJ9MRKrH&b=6493233&ct=9315031. 
 280 See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 69, at 1296. 
 281 Cf. Reed, supra note 38, at 899 (“The constitutionalization of a conflict through initiative politics 
affects the type of mobilization and its intersection with other political actors and institutions.”). 
 282 See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 69, at 1308–10. 
 283 The conventional social movement account claims that “goal transformation inevitably takes the 
direction of greater conservatism—the accommodation of the [social movement organization’s] goals to the 
dominant societal consensus.” Kriesi, supra note 32, at 156. 
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consensus issues. In addition, a highly responsive countermovement, which 
viewed marriage as the endgame, contributed to increasing LGBT activity 
around marriage. With single-issue organizations like the National 
Organization for Marriage fighting LGBT rights advocates on every front,284 
the Christian Right movement has devoted significant attention and resources 
to the marriage fight. LGBT rights advocates, of course, must respond. A 
strong countermovement focused on a particularly important issue limits the 
original movement’s ability to push a multi-issue agenda.285 
2. Formally Organizing Around the Legal Right to Marry 
Greater mobilization around the legal right to marry within the LGBT 
movement base opened up space for additional organizations dedicated to 
marriage.286 This internal mobilization interacted with the external 
mainstreaming of the social movement norm, discussed in Part III.B, to 
produce a narrowing effect on both issues and tactics.287 As social movement 
scholarship demonstrates, greater formalization and professionalization, and a 
corresponding reliance on institutional tactics, benefit the movement with 
greater resources and legitimacy at the same time that they moderate the 
movement’s demands and tactics.288 
 
 284 See About NOM, NAT’L ORG. FOR MARRIAGE, http://www.nationformarriage.org/site/c. 
omL2KeN0LzH/b.3479573/k.E2D0/About_NOM.htm (last visited July 5, 2012). 
 285 See STAGGENBORG, supra note 58, at 122 (observing this phenomenon in the reproductive rights 
movement); see also Colin Barker & Michael Lavalette, Strategizing and the Sense of Context: Reflections on 
the First Two Weeks of the Liverpool Docks Lockout, September–October 1995, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: 
IDENTITY, CULTURE, AND THE STATE, supra note 242, at 140, 143 (“[S]trategizing is an interactive or 
relational process: what we decide to do is affected by what others are deciding and doing.”). 
 286 McAdam argues that, “[f]or the movement to survive, insurgents must be able to create a more 
enduring organizational structure to sustain insurgency. Efforts to do so usually entail the creation of formally 
constituted organizations to assume the centralized direction of the movement previously exercised by 
informal groups.” MCADAM, supra note 242, at 54. 
 287 As Amy Kapczynski convincingly shows in the intellectual property context:  
As groups begin to succeed in changing law, . . . these successes may promote some strands of 
the movement over others. To the extent that less disruptive reform efforts are likely to have 
more success, they may begin to take center stage in the movement. This is yet another way to 
understand law as a constitutive force in the dynamics of political mobilization. 
Kapczynski, supra note 38, at 876. 
 288 See Kriesi, supra note 32, at 156 (“Institutionalization implies a whole set of transformations in the 
course of which an SMO [social movement organization] becomes more like a party or an interest group. This 
set includes the stabilization of an SMO’s resource flow, the development of its internal structure, the 
moderation of its goals, the conventionalization of its action repertoire, and its integration into established 
systems of interest intermediation.”). 
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The LGBT movement’s greatest period of organizational founding 
occurred at another pivotal, law-centered moment in the movement’s history—
the wake of the Bowers loss. Similar to the mobilization around marriage after 
the passage of Proposition 8, Bowers produced massive demonstrations.289 
Movement activists used the loss to drive fundraising that aided existing 
organizations and supported new organizations specifically aimed at 
overturning antisodomy laws.290 Likewise, in recent years, organizations have 
emerged—at both the state and national levels—aimed at achieving marriage 
equality. Many state-level organizations, such as New Yorkers United for 
Marriage291 and California’s Love Honor Cherish,292 emerged in states with 
favorable political environments. Freedom to Marry, formed in 2003 by former 
Lambda Legal lawyer Wolfson, coordinates efforts on a national scale.293 
Unlike many other new organizations targeting marriage equality, AFER 
organized in opposition to, rather than in coordination with, existing movement 
organizations and professional movement leadership.294 Griffin, a gay political 
consultant and strategist in Los Angeles, approached LGBT leaders at the main 
California legal organizations about bringing a federal lawsuit challenging 
Proposition 8.295 When they advised against the litigation, Griffin moved 
forward independently and recruited to AFER high-profile colleagues, 
including some from the entertainment industry.296 While some of AFER’s 
founders had contributed to LGBT rights work,297 they had not occupied 
leadership roles at movement organizations.298 With AFER, wealthy, 
connected movement members decided to formally organize around marriage 
equality outside of existing movement channels. Yet they created an 
 
 289 Boutcher, supra note 37, at 10–11. 
 290 Id.; NeJaime, supra note 25, at 985–86. 
 291 See Michael Barbaro, Behind Gay Marriage, an Unlikely Mix of Forces, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2011, at 
A1. 
 292 See About LHC, LOVE HONOR CHERISH, http://lovehonorcherish.org/about-lhc/ (last visited July 5, 
2012). 
 293 About Freedom to Marry, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/about-us (last 
visited July 5, 2012). Wolfson played a major role in the successful effort to pass marriage-equality legislation 
in New York. See Michael Barbaro, With Cuomo’s Help, Groups Mobilize for Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 20, 2011, at A18. 
 294 New Yorkers United for Marriage, for instance, was formed as an alliance of established LGBT rights 
organizations. See Barbaro, supra note 293. 
 295 See supra notes 222–25 and accompanying text. 
 296 See Leadership, supra note 65 (indicating that AFER’s Board includes gay screenwriter Dustin Lance 
Black and gay producer Bruce Cohen). 
 297 See, e.g., Tina Daunt, Brad Pitt Puts Up to Fight Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at E2 
(explaining that Chad Griffin coordinated entertainment-industry efforts to defeat Proposition 8). 
 298 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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organization and chose an institutional tactic consistent with the 
professionalized organizational structure and tactical repertoire of the most 
powerful segments of the LGBT movement. 
Professionalized and formalized organizations, many of which are legal 
groups, lead the LGBT movement.299 LGBT legal organizations, which have 
engineered and implemented the movement’s successful legal mobilization 
strategy, generally have hierarchical and formal structures300 and employ elite-
credentialed, full-time professional staff.301 As sociologist Sandra Levitsky has 
shown, legal organizations in the LGBT movement enjoy a disproportionate 
amount of movement resources and control movement decision making to a 
significant degree.302 These organizations also enjoy access to elites, 
government officials, and the media that less resource-rich and 
professionalized groups do not.303 In short, the LGBT movement has coalesced 
around a highly formalized and professionalized organizational structure, with 
legal organizations at its core. 
In the tradition of other leading movement organizations, Griffin created a 
professionalized organization with which to pursue the goal of marriage 
equality through litigation. The organization has a board of directors and an 
advisory board.304 Its staff includes a communications director, development 
director, research and communications manager, project director, online 
director, and research associate.305 And, of course, the organization retains two 
high-profile, high-powered lawyers, Olson and Boies, to implement its legal 
strategy.306 
3. Litigating the Right to Marry 
Social movement theory recognizes the narrowing effects that movement 
institutionalization can have not only on issues but also on tactics. Formalized 
 
 299 See NeJaime, supra note 25, at 973–74. Social movement scholarship recognizes that, “as social 
movements develop over time, they often become more and more institutionalized.” David A. Snow et al., 
Mapping the Terrain, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 187, at 3, 8. 
 300 See Levitsky, supra note 26, at 154. 
 301 See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 69, at 1253–54. 
 302 See Levitsky, supra note 26, at 157–58; accord Bernstein et al., supra note 28, at 10 (“[W]hen they 
have superior resources, cause lawyers may sometimes determine a movement’s strategies and priorities.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 303 See Levitsky, supra note 26, at 157. 
 304 Leadership, supra note 65. 
 305 Id. 
 306 Id. 
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and professionalized social movement organizations are more likely to use 
institutional than confrontational tactics,307 and institutional tactics, including 
litigation, may moderate the movement’s frames and goals.308 In this sense, 
AFER’s prioritization of litigation follows logically from its organizational 
structure and substantive agenda, which in many ways reflect the legacy of the 
LGBT legal organizations AFER is challenging. 
Yet several factors may have influenced AFER’s choice of litigation as its 
primary tactic. Unlike many other single-issue organizations in the movement, 
AFER does not prioritize deference to other movement organizations.309 Its use 
of litigation offers a prime tactic for the organization to strike out on its own, 
rather than coordinate strategy with other movement actors. Groups like Love 
Honor Cherish and the Courage Campaign attempted to defy more established 
movement organizations, such as Equality California and Lambda Legal, by 
pursuing a Proposition 8 repeal initiative—an institutional tactic—aimed at the 
2010 ballot. But without broad-based movement consensus and donor 
commitment, these organizations were unable to raise the necessary funds and 
garner the constituent support needed to qualify the initiative for the ballot.310 
AFER, on the other hand, can pursue litigation without movement consensus. 
The ability of movement members to strike out on their own with litigation 
is mirrored by the ability of a single judge to strike out in favor of the 
movement’s cause. At least at the federal level, litigation’s reliance on 
relatively insulated elites makes it a compelling strategy for activists. Indeed, 
 
 307 See Kriesi, supra note 32, at 158 (“[F]ormalized and professionalized SMOs tend to engage in 
institutionalized tactics and typically do not initiate disruptive direct-action tactics.”); Staggenborg, supra note 
32, at 604 (noting “[t]he tendency of formalized SMOs to engage in more institutionalized strategies and 
tactics than informal SMOs”). 
 308 See Albiston, supra note 6, at 74 (“[S]everal scholars have shown how litigation as a social movement 
tactic can deradicalize both the message and the objectives of a movement.”). 
 309 See Chuleenan Svetvilas, Anatomy of a Complaint: How Hollywood Activists Seized Control of the 
Fight for Gay Marriage, CAL. LAW., Jan. 2010, at 20, 22 (providing Nan Hunter’s statements on AFER’s 
independence and its lack of coordination with LGBT movement organizations). In arguing that elite 
patronage “channeled” the black civil rights movement into professional social movement organizations, Craig 
Jenkins and Craig Eckert distinguish between professional organizations with roots in the movement—what 
they call indigenous organizations—and those that spring from elite patronage and “political entrepreneurs” 
without roots in the movement—independent organizations. See J. Craig Jenkins & Craig M. Eckert, 
Channeling Black Insurgency: Elite Patronage and Professional Social Movement Organizations in the 
Development of the Black Movement, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 812, 827–28 (1986). They show that, in the black civil 
rights movement, indigenous organizations supported the central movement organizations while independent 
organizations pursued agendas that conflicted with movement leaders’ decisions. Id. at 827. 
 310 See Dolan, supra note 163. Love Honor Cherish also pursued a 2012 repeal initiative, even after 
Equality California made a decision not to do so. See Wilkey, supra note 178. 
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other social movements upon which the LGBT movement modeled itself used 
litigation as a key social-change strategy, looking to independent federal 
judges as important rights protectors.311 And AFER understands its strategy as 
part of the American tradition of civil rights litigation. Its lawyer, Olson, has 
compared Perry to Loving v. Virginia,312 the Supreme Court decision 
invalidating laws against interracial marriage.313 Even Judge Reinhardt, in his 
concurrence in the Ninth Circuit decision certifying the standing question to 
the California Supreme Court, located the Perry case and its purpose in the 
same category as Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade.314 
Nonetheless, the organized LGBT movement’s successful and far-reaching 
legal mobilization strategy influenced, both directly and indirectly, AFER’s 
choice of litigation tactics. LGBT rights, and marriage equality in particular, 
have been framed in a legal—indeed, constitutional—way, suggesting that 
courts are appropriate—and perhaps necessary—venues for reform. Courts 
have been the state decision makers most receptive to LGBT rights claims, and 
courts were the first official actors to offer broad, authoritative support to the 
modern marriage-equality movement.315 Courts have played, and continue to 
play, an essential role in the quest for LGBT equality. In California, the 
governor twice vetoed marriage-equality legislation;316 it was the California 
Supreme Court that produced marriage equality as a constitutional right, only 
to have that right eliminated through the ballot-initiative process.317 In the 
choice between courts and majoritarian politics, at least in California, courts 
seem more hospitable.318 
While I am not making a causal claim about legal mobilization and 
subsequent lawsuits challenging movement strategy, the trajectory of marriage 
equality suggests that the LGBT movement’s legal mobilization strategy, while 
highly sophisticated and multidimensional, built movement support for court-
centered tactics in a way that channeled subsequent activism into litigation. 
And as I show in the next section, movement advocates’ successful legal 
 
 311 See NeJaime, supra note 255, at 321. 
 312 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 313 See Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal, NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 2010, at 40, 40, 42 (documenting 
Olson’s comparisons to Loving and the civil rights struggle). 
 314 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2011) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 315 See ANDERSEN, supra note 86, at 173–74. 
 316 See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 69, at 1290. 
 317 See id. at 1293–95. 
 318 See id. 
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mobilization strategy changed the external environment significantly, in ways 
that increased the appeal and viability of a federal marriage lawsuit. 
B. Mainstreaming Marriage Equality 
In this section, I focus on what I term “the mainstreaming of marriage 
equality”—and LGBT equality more generally—which the movement’s legal 
mobilization strategy has helped to produce.319 By mainstreaming, I mean that 
the movement has both gained public traction and attracted the sympathy of 
elites and governmental actors.320 The mainstreaming of marriage equality, 
along with a general norm of LGBT equality, has opened up significant 
avenues for activism, including additional legal channels. Whereas movement 
leaders had long worked within the limited spaces amenable to LGBT rights 
claims, advocates now find substantially greater support from the general 
public and from elites, including state actors. Legal actors have been some of 
the most receptive state actors, and constitutional doctrine has evolved to 
reflect increasing support for LGBT equality. As I show in this section, AFER 
has appealed to elites for organizational support and has seized on a political 
opportunity structure increasingly receptive to recognition of same-sex 
couples’ legal right to marry. 
1. Attracting Elites 
Successful legal mobilization increased the salience of the marriage-
equality issue and convinced elites and ordinary citizens to support the 
cause.321 Elite support in particular allowed movement constituents to find new 
resources with which to pursue the central movement goal of marriage 
equality. Elites, who are often seen as drivers of policy changes and public-
 
 319 See ANDERSEN, supra note 86, at 201 (explaining how state supreme courts adjudicating marriage 
claims “fomented widespread change in the cultural framing of marriage by forcing the issue of same-sex 
marriage into mainstream consciousness”); HULL, supra note 200, at 205 (“[M]ovement gains may not 
translate directly into public support for legal recognition of same-sex couples, but their cumulative indirect 
effect in changing perceptions of the status of gays and lesbians in American society should not be 
underestimated.”). 
 320 Kathleen Hull links LGBT legal gains to growing cultural visibility when discussing “the political and 
cultural mainstreaming of gays.” See HULL, supra note 200, at 7. My concept of mainstreaming also resonates 
with Jack Balkin’s work on the interaction between social movements and constitutional law and adjudication. 
See Balkin, The Constitution of Status, supra note 36, at 2342 (“Few legal elites thought sexual orientation 
could be a suspect classification until social movements began to change their political imaginations.”). 
 321 See NeJaime, supra note 103, at 181–83. 
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opinion shifts,322 provide access to their connections and networks.323 While 
elite support includes both private and state actors, I focus first on private 
elites. The next subsection addresses elite government support through the lens 
of political opportunity. 
Legal mobilization scholars have shown that litigation-based strategies may 
garner elite support, and such support is vital to a movement’s success, helping 
the movement to raise funds, earn legitimacy, and bargain with powerful 
private and governmental actors.324 This position runs counter to the classic 
account in social movement scholarship, which provides a more pessimistic 
view of elite support, drawing attention to its narrowing and co-optive 
effects.325 More recent social movement scholarship qualifies the conventional 
account, instead demonstrating that access to elites, which corresponds to 
movement professionalization and formalization, may contribute to social 
movement progress and survival.326 Together, these strands of scholarship 
present a complicated and contingent view of elite support as both important to 
a movement’s development and threatening to that movement’s more 
expansive agenda.327 Accordingly, we might expect to see elite support fuel 
and sustain the LGBT movement at the same time that it influences goals and 
tactics in a generally conservative direction. 
AFER has capitalized on the support of cultural, political, business, and 
legal elites. First, AFER has seized on support from cultural elites who had 
 
 322 See Adam Liptak, A Tipping Point for Gay Marriage?, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, at WK3. Indeed, 
Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins argue that Supreme Court Justices are more responsive to the views of elites 
than to those of the general public. See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About 
Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515 (2010). 
 323 See STAGGENBORG, supra note 54, at 153 (emphasizing the importance of “persons with connections 
to wealthy individuals, legislators, professionals, and other influential people and organizations”). 
 324 See, e.g., Keck, supra note 86, at 164; Michael Paris, Legal Mobilization and the Politics of Reform: 
Lessons from School Finance Litigation in Kentucky, 1984–1995, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 631, 633–36 
(2001). 
 325 See MCADAM, supra note 242, at 27 (“[E]lite involvement in social protest may more often contribute 
to the demise of a movement than to its success.”); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 31, at xi (“[I]t is not 
possible to compel concessions from elites that can be used as resources to sustain oppositional organizations 
over time.”). 
 326 See Staggenborg, supra note 32, at 597 (“[F]ormalized SMOs [social movement organizations] are the 
usual beneficiaries of foundation funding and other elite contributions. Consequently, formalized SMOs are 
able to maintain themselves—and the movement—over a longer period of time than are informal SMOs.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 327 See DUPUIS, supra note 89, at 9 (claiming that elite support aided the marriage-equality cause but also 
pointing out that litigation tactics “attract support from middle-class and corporate contributors who would be 
unlikely to support more radical or disruptive types of activity”); MCADAM, supra note 242, at 27 
(“[E]lite/movement linkages reflect a trade-off between benefits obtained and costs incurred.”). 
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otherwise not been fully activated in legal advocacy for marriage equality. For 
instance, AFER board members include Hollywood figures Rob and Michele 
Reiner; while the couple had long devoted themselves to children’s advocacy, 
they are now active fundraisers for marriage equality.328 And AFER’s high-
profile benefits have featured prominent entertainment figures and 
celebrities.329 
Second, AFER has garnered support from political and business elites 
across the ideological spectrum.330 By focusing on a single goal—marriage 
equality—and by pursuing that goal through a professionalized and formalized 
organization that relies on an institutional tactic, AFER has attracted support 
from moderates and conservatives who might refuse to identify with (or might 
actually reject) the broader and more progressive agenda of LGBT movement 
organizations.331 Paul Singer, a high-profile Republican donor and hedge-fund 
CEO, is a prominent supporter, along with PayPal founder Peter Thiel.332 The 
organization’s Advisory Board is co-chaired by Robert Levy, chairman of the 
libertarian Cato Institute, and John Podesta, president of the left-leaning Center 
for American Progress.333 The liberal and conservative pairings universalize 
and depoliticize marriage equality in an attempt to attract more support for the 
cause.334 
 
 328 See Leadership, supra note 65. 
 329 See, e.g., Rebecca Keegan, Elton John Fetes Crowd at Ron Burkle’s Estate in Support of Prop. 8 
Court Challenge, L.A. TIMES MUSIC BLOG (Jan. 20, 2011, 2:44 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/music_ 
blog/2011/01/elton-john-fetes-crowd-at-ron-burkles-estate-in-support-of-prop-8-court-challenge.html?cid= 
6a00d8341c630a53ef0147e1cc3b35970b. Social movement scholars have noted that celebrity support can 
function as an important moral resource. See Bob Edwards & John D. McCarthy, Resources and Social 
Movement Mobilization, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 187, at 116, 
125. 
 330 Here, I refer to political elites who are prominent nongovernmental actors. Rather than include state 
officials in the category of political elites, I refer here only to elite policy players, including many former state 
officials. 
 331 See MCADAM, supra note 242, at 28 (“Co-optation can occur either in advance of elite support, as the 
organization seeks to modify its operation in such a way as to make itself ‘acceptable’ to elite sponsors, or 
after receipt of support, as a condition of continued backing.”). 
 332 Peter Lattman, Gay Marriage Gets Boost from Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 23, 2010, 
9:20 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/gay-marriage-gets-boost-from-wall-street/. 
 333 See Leadership, supra note 65. 
 334 See Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, Wealthy Donors to G.O.P. Are Providing Bulk of Money 
in Gay Marriage Push, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2011, at A15. AFER’s deployment of diverse ideological leaders 
bolsters accounts in social movement work. See Aldon D. Morris & Suzanne Staggenborg, Leadership in 
Social Movements, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 187, at 171, 189 
(“Social movement leaders drawn from outside of the challenging group are valuable because they may be 
anchored in social networks otherwise unavailable to the challenging group . . . .”); Williams, supra note 243, 
at 105 (emphasizing the importance of “[c]redibility” for “the frame content and those who proffer it”). 
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Not only do elites provide important rhetorical support for AFER and its 
cause, but they also help raise substantial funds in relatively short periods of 
time,335 and these funds fuel AFER’s litigation campaign. The organization has 
targeted two elite epicenters—Los Angeles on the West Coast and New York 
on the East Coast. A star-studded fundraiser in Beverly Hills featured a concert 
by Elton John and raised roughly three million dollars in a single night.336 
Prominent Republican political figures Ken Mehlman, Bill Weld, and Christine 
Todd Whitman, along with business leaders Thiel and Singer, co-hosted a New 
York fundraiser.337 AFER’s resource-rich support base has a mutually 
reinforcing relationship to the organization’s institutional tactics.338 Wealthy 
elites in politics, law, and business donate money to support AFER’s litigation 
tactics, which work within established channels.339 
As much as AFER has garnered attention from Hollywood to Wall Street, 
its most significant and high-profile support comes from the legal elite. LGBT 
rights work, including marriage equality, increasingly has garnered support 
from the legal profession. This ties to the movement’s early use of courts and 
its appeal to constitutional rights claims. The LGBT movement’s legal 
mobilization strategy provided significant opportunities for large law firms and 
high-profile lawyers to become involved in LGBT rights advocacy. Marriage-
equality work in particular has played a prominent role in large-firm pro bono 
practice and is touted by major firms for recruitment purposes.340 Indeed, 
Justice Scalia has complained that elite lawyers, law schools, and law firms 
have taken sides in the culture wars and have outpaced public opinion on 
LGBT rights.341 While elite lawyers and law firms have frequently worked on 
behalf of marriage equality, lawyers at LGBT rights organizations nonetheless 
 
 335 See MCADAM, supra note 242, at 27. 
 336 Andrew Harmon, Elton John Rocks for Equality, ADVOCATE (Jan. 20, 2011, 11:35 AM), http://www. 
advocate.com/News/Daily_News/2011/01/20/Elton_John_Rocks_for_Equality/. 
 337 Bennett Roth, Pro-Gay Groups Find New Allies in the GOP, ROLL CALL (Sept. 22, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_28/-50098-1.html. 
 338 See John D. McCarthy et al., Accessing Public, Media, Electoral, and Governmental Agendas, in 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, 
AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS, supra note 32, at 291, 305 (“[T]he greater the resources of groups, the more they 
will employ ‘insider’ tactics (e.g., lobbying, litigating) . . . .”). 
 339 See Meyer & Staggenborg, supra note 187, at 233 (“[T]he availability of apparently powerful 
institutional allies encourages institutionally oriented strategies . . . .”). 
 340 See Dale Carpenter, How the Law Accepted Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2011, at A27. From a resource 
mobilization perspective, elite lawyers are seen to provide resources based on their professional skills and 
status, which yield access to power and money. See Jones, supra note 37, at 203. 
 341 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602–03 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 652–53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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have initiated and directed those suits. The Perry litigation represents a new 
direction as elite lawyers at large firms initiated the (fee-generating) suit 
without the direct involvement of movement lawyers and, more surprisingly, in 
direct contravention of their advice. 
AFER’s representation by Olson and Boies produces important benefits, 
both in and out of court. These high-profile lawyers bring the resources of their 
large law firms to the table. While they did not take the case on a pro bono 
basis (attesting to the financial resources of AFER), they have donated some 
portion of their legal services.342 Moreover, they assembled expert litigation 
teams at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and Boies, Schiller & Flexner; these teams 
can rely on the vast resources and professional staff of their large, national law 
firms. Olson and Boies have taken to the airwaves and received coverage in 
high-profile print media. The day the filing was announced featured a press-
conference broadcast by cable news outlets followed by an appearance on 
Larry King Live.343 Olson and Boies have since appeared in the New York 
Times,344 the New Yorker,345 and TIME,346 among other prominent press 
outlets.347 And by explicitly making the “[c]onservative [c]ase for [g]ay 
[m]arriage,” Olson appeals to conservatives in a way that LGBT movement 
lawyers and liberal elite allies cannot.348 
2. Influencing the Political Opportunity Structure 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, legal mobilization has produced a 
more open and favorable political opportunity structure, both inside and 
 
 342 See Svetvilas, supra note 309, at 24–25. 
 343 See Larry King Live—May 27, 2009, AM. FOUND. FOR EQUAL RTS., http://www.afer.org/media/larry-
king-live-may-2-2009/ (last visited July 5, 2012). 
 344 See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, Bush v. Gore Foes Join to Fight Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 
2009, at A1. 
 345 See, e.g., Talbot, supra note 313. 
 346 See, e.g., Michael A. Lindenberger, Olson’s Gay Marriage Gambit: Powerful but Risky, TIME (June 
4, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1902556,00.html. 
 347 Social movement scholarship stresses the importance of movement leaders’ use of the media for 
framing purposes. See William A. Gamson, Bystanders, Public Opinion, and the Media, in THE BLACKWELL 
COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 187, at 242, 242–43, 251; Morris & Staggenborg, supra note 
334, at 186. 
 348 Theodore B. Olson, The Conservative Case for Gay Marriage, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 18, 2010, at 48; 
accord Svetvilas, supra note 309, at 23 (“[Olson’s involvement] could make same-sex marriage be seen as a 
nonpartisan issue—forget bipartisan.” (quoting Chad H. Griffin, Board President, American Foundation for 
Equal Rights) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
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outside the courts.349 First, litigation by LGBT rights lawyers has influenced 
elite alignments in states across the country, pushing more elected officials to 
support the cause.350 In California, the back-and-forth battle over marriage 
equality, which involved multiple rounds of litigation, facilitated significant 
changes in the positions of key government officials.351 Second, the federal 
courts have become increasingly receptive to LGBT rights claims and have 
seized on important doctrinal developments to further expand the rights of 
same-sex couples. AFER has capitalized on the increasing number of state 
actors—including government officials and federal judges—sympathetic to 
marriage equality and has asked these actors to use evolving constitutional 
principles to advance the cause. 
As leading social movement theorist Doug McAdam explains, political 
process scholarship has coalesced around the following dimensions of political 
opportunity: 
1. [t]he relative openness or closure of the institutionalized 
political system[;] 
2. [t]he stability or instability of that broad set of elite 
alignments that typically undergird a polity[;] 
3. [t]he presence or absence of elite allies[; and] 
4. [t]he state’s capacity and propensity for repression.352 
 
 349 Cf. Bernstein et al., supra note 28, at 10 (“The current configuration of political elites and the path set 
by prior political organizing become structural features of the state that shape and are influenced by court 
decisions.”). In his study of the day-labor movement, Scott Cummings notes that, “[b]ecause the legal 
campaign has occurred over a nearly twenty-year period, its effectiveness has been influenced . . . by changes 
in the political and legal environment.” Scott L. Cummings, Litigation at Work: Defending Day Labor in Los 
Angeles, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1617, 1692 (2011). 
 350 See NeJaime, supra note 103, at 186–94. 
 351 See id. at 190. 
 352 Doug McAdam, Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions, in COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND 
CULTURAL FRAMINGS, supra note 32, at 23, 27. Similarly, Mark Wolfson explains that the political 
opportunity structure 
describe[s] the political environment in which a movement operates and with which it interacts. It 
includes the degree of openness of the formal political structure to advocacy efforts, the nature of 
alignments between powerful ‘elites,’ actual alliances between movements and these elites, and 
the state’s ability and inclination to repress a movement. 
MARK WOLFSON, THE FIGHT AGAINST BIG TOBACCO: THE MOVEMENT, THE STATE, AND THE PUBLIC’S 
HEALTH 5 (2001) (citations omitted). Social movement scholars have criticized the concept of political 
opportunity structure for becoming increasingly capacious and imprecise. See, e.g., Kriesi, supra note 187, at 
68–69. 
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The political opportunity structure, therefore, includes both “the formal 
institutional or legal structure of a given political system” and “the more 
informal structure of power relations that characterize the system at a given 
point in time.”353 Drawing on McAdam’s work on political opportunity, my 
analysis locates changing political alignments within a federalist system by 
focusing on interactions between federal courts and state governments. 
However, I expand on social movement theory, which largely has overlooked 
the complexities of court-based interactions, by situating judges and doctrine 
as key features of the political opportunity structure.354 
By focusing on governmental actors’ increasing cooperation and 
identification with the LGBT movement, I am pointing to potential movement–
state overlap.355 In this sense, my analysis follows from recent social 
movement work arguing that “we cannot merely label the state as political 
opportunity because movement–state intersections mean that some state-based 
political opportunities are in fact parts of the movement itself.”356 The state is 
composed of individuals who are influenced by movement advances and may 
include movement actors.357 Wayne Santoro and Gail McGuire, for instance, 
criticize resource mobilization theory to the extent that it understands 
movement actors and political elites as distinct categories that do not 
overlap.358 Instead, they identify actors within political institutions who pursue 
social movement goals as institutional activists, a category that blurs the 
traditional movement–state distinction.359 
 
 353 McAdam, supra note 352, at 26; accord Kriesi, supra note 32, at 160; Sidney Tarrow, States and 
Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS, supra note 
32, at 41, 54. 
 354 As Edward Rubin argues, social movement scholarship has failed to address “the substance of 
litigation and law reform efforts, the specific legal arguments that advocates for social movements advance in 
judicial proceedings, and the specific statutory language that they propose in legislative lobbying.” Rubin, 
supra note 34, at 47. For an important exception to this oversight in social movement scholarship, see 
ANDERSEN, supra note 86. 
 355 See WOLFSON, supra note 352, at 13 (“The state is not limited to being an external force that acts on, 
or is acted upon by, the movement, but is in fact an integral part of the movement.”). 
 356 LEE ANN BANASZAK, THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE STATE 196 (2010). 
 357 See WOLFSON, supra note 352, at 189 (“The term ‘interpenetration’ is bidirectional, reflecting my 
observation that the state and movement organizations have a symbiotic relationship that involves both mutual 
influence and mutual benefit.”). 
 358 See Santoro & McGuire, supra note 181, at 503. 
 359 Id. at 504. 
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The political opportunity structure is dynamic, and the movement itself is 
active in shaping that structure for its advantage.360 That government officials 
and judges, many of whom have been public servants for several years, are 
now more willing to take pro-LGBT positions suggests that there is a 
significant cultural component to political opportunity. Movements do not 
merely respond to exogenous changes; instead, they shape elite alignments and 
sentiment.361 The mainstreaming of LGBT equality produced by LGBT rights 
activism influences state actors, who are not immune from the effects of large-
scale social and cultural shifts. In this regard, my analysis again follows the 
lead of recent social movement work that takes the cultural turn in sociology to 
an understanding of political opportunity.362 
Recognizing that state actors are not merely targets in the political 
opportunity structure but rather active, engaged participants with their own 
motivations and constraints points to certain consequences of state 
involvement.363 Recent work showing both how movements enter the state and 
how the state may become an important movement force attempts to 
understand the implications of movement–state overlap for goals and tactics.364 
While state actors may at times use confrontational tactics, they are generally 
limited in their choice of tactics and range of goals. State allies might have an 
especially significant impact on policy outcomes because of their power and 
access,365 but they may also be expected to rely on institutional means to 
pursue moderate objectives.366 Therefore, work with and reliance upon these 
state actors might channel the movement toward less disruptive tactics and 
 
 360 See McAdam, supra note 352, at 37 (pointing out “the typically fluid, reciprocal, unpredictable, and 
crucially important relationship of social movements to structures of political opportunity”). 
 361 See BANASZAK, supra note 356, at 20 (“[T]he story of insider feminist activists is not one of a group 
within civil society capturing the bureaucracy but of a more synergistic relationship between state and civil 
society where the state is not immune to large scale social forces.”). 
 362 See Gamson & Meyer, supra note 187, at 279 (“Opportunity has a strong cultural component . . . .”). 
 363 See BANASZAK, supra note 356, at 187 (“[W]e can better understand all social movements if we view 
the movement–state intersection as a central theoretical concept with identifiable dimensions . . . .”). 
 364 See Lee Ann Banaszak, Inside and Outside the State: Movement Insider Status, Tactics, and Public 
Policy Achievements, in ROUTING THE OPPOSITION: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND DEMOCRACY 
149, 154 (David S. Meyer et al. eds., 2005) (explaining the impact of movement–state overlap “on the 
development and tactics of the movement as well as on state–movement interactions and their outcomes”). 
 365 See Santoro & McGuire, supra note 181, at 505 (“Institutional activists are important in policy 
outcomes because of their direct access, influence, and control over government resources.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 366 See id. at 504 (“[I]nstitutional activists [are] social movement participants who occupy formal statuses 
within the government and who pursue movement goals through conventional bureaucratic channels.”). 
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goals. Legal actors might emerge as important elites,367 and litigation might 
present a particularly attractive avenue for movement–state interactions.368 
Ultimately, state support might track the complicated picture of elite support 
more generally.369 
a. State Government Officials 
Successful legal mobilization by the organized LGBT movement 
contributed to a more open and favorable political opportunity structure. Many 
state actors now see lesbians and gay men as good citizens, committed 
partners, and loving parents. What were once considered controversial 
positions are now mainstream ideas held by those at the highest levels of 
government. Legal mobilization played a substantial role in validating LGBT 
equality norms and gaining the support of state (and often legal) actors.370 
In California, marriage-equality litigation contributed to a dynamic and 
increasingly favorable political opportunity structure that included new elite 
alignments. Openings first emerged in local government. San Francisco Mayor 
Gavin Newsom initiated the marriage-equality effort in California, itself a 
response to Goodridge and President Bush’s call for a federal marriage 
amendment.371 Newsom’s actions invited litigation by Christian Right 
organizations and the state attorney general.372 The City and County of San 
Francisco defended Newsom’s position and eventually filed its own 
constitutional challenge to the statutory marriage prohibition.373 With the issue 
of marriage equality firmly in the courts, LGBT rights lawyers at Lambda 
Legal, NCLR, and the ACLU filed litigation of their own and challenged the 
state’s marriage restriction up to the California Supreme Court.374 
The California attorney general defended the marriage restriction, yet in 
doing so made limited and circumspect arguments. The state did not offer 
procreation and parenting as justifications, even though those rationales had 
 
 367 See WOLFSON, supra note 352, at 13 (identifying the Minnesota Attorney General as a “state agency 
that is heavily involved, in a proactive way, in tobacco control advocacy”). 
 368 See id. at 209. 
 369 See id. at 200 (pointing to the “double-edged nature of state involvement in movements: access to a 
wide variety of resources (including expertise, money, legitimacy, and influence) is counterbalanced by 
constraints on the selection of goals, strategies, and tactics”). 
 370 See NeJaime, supra note 103, at 188–90. 
 371 See Law, supra note 266, at 5–6. 
 372 See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 69, at 1281. 
 373 Id. at 1281–82. 
 374 See id. at 1282–84. 
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figured prominently (and, at times, successfully) in earlier defenses of 
marriage restrictions in other states.375 The state’s unwillingness to argue from 
procreation and childrearing makes sense as a matter of demographic reality; 
as the Williams Institute has shown, and as Chief Justice George pointed out, 
approximately thirty percent of same-sex couples in California are raising 
children.376 Yet recognition of demographics cannot solely account for this 
shift; after all, states in which procreation arguments figured prominently also 
had significant numbers of children being raised by same-sex couples.377 The 
state’s reluctance to argue from procreation and childrearing also makes sense 
in light of California’s pro-LGBT legal landscape. The domestic-partnership 
statute provides practically all the substantive benefits and obligations of 
marriage,378 and state court decisions recognize the ability of lesbians and gay 
men to parent effectively.379 Yet, other states with pro-LGBT laws and policies 
advanced arguments based on procreation and childrearing.380 Instead, the 
California attorney general’s carefully limited arguments show the influence of 
LGBT mainstreaming and suggest that increasingly pro-LGBT actors occupied 
positions inside the state. 
 
 375 See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (accepting justifications based on accidental 
procreation and dual-gender parenting); HULL, supra note 200, at 166 (discussing such arguments by the State 
of Vermont). 
 376 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 433 n.50 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 377 In New York, for instance, the state relied primarily on the connection between different-sex marriage 
and procreation. See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 30 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). In upholding the state’s marriage 
restriction, the Hernandez majority responded to the state’s arguments by concluding that “the Legislature 
could rationally proceed on the commonsense premise that children will do best with a mother and father in 
the home.” Id. at 8 (majority opinion). These child-welfare arguments figured prominently even though a 
significant percentage of same-sex couples in New York were raising children. Indeed, Chief Judge Kaye 
noted in her dissent that “tens of thousands of children are currently being raised by same-sex couples in New 
York.” Id. at 32 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). And Lambda Legal pointed out in its brief that, according to the 2000 
United States Census data on New York same-sex couples, “[o]ver 34% of . . . lesbian couples and 21% 
of . . . gay male couples [we]re raising children in their homes.” Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 86, 
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d 1 (No. 103434/04). 
 378 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West Supp. 2012) 
 379 See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005); Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 
2005). 
 380 Again, New York is illustrative. The State advanced, and the court credited, arguments based on 
procreation and childrearing even as Lambda Legal attorneys argued that a significant body of pro-LGBT law 
in New York undermined the State’s reliance on such arguments. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra 
note 377, at 87 (“Court precedents fostering and protecting the bonds between lesbian and gay parents and 
their children confirm New York’s firm view that gay people are no different than anyone else in their fitness 
as parents.”). 
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At oral argument before the California Supreme Court, procreation and 
childrearing were not mentioned until social-conservative advocacy groups 
participated.381 Justice Kennard noted at length that the petitioners presented a 
fairly unified front, while those defending the marriage restriction were in 
seeming disarray.382 Kennard distinguished between “the state entities,” which 
included the attorney general’s office and the Governor’s attorney, and “the 
private entities,” which included two social-conservative groups, the 
Proposition 22 Legal Defense and Education Fund and the Campaign for 
California Families.383 As Justice Kennard and her colleagues probed further, it 
became clear that the state entities were willing to submit only three (relatively 
thin) arguments in favor of the state’s marriage restriction: tradition, legislative 
primacy, and the will of the people.384 They were unwilling to argue that the 
marriage restriction furthered responsible procreation, ensured an optimal 
environment for raising children, or protected marriage between different-sex 
couples. Understanding the narrowness of the State’s position explains why the 
private entities clung so fiercely to a place in the litigation; they needed to put 
before the court substantive arguments that they saw as justifying the 
restriction on marriage yet not advanced by the State’s attorneys. The 
inconsistencies between the state and private entities serve as first-hand 
evidence of the mainstreaming and institutionalization of LGBT equality 
norms. 
After a favorable ruling by the California Supreme Court and the 
subsequent passage of Proposition 8, Lambda Legal, NCLR, and the ACLU 
challenged the initiative in the state supreme court as a constitutional revision, 
rather than a mere amendment.385 A revision would have required legislative 
approval before a vote.386 Advocates argued that Proposition 8 altered the 
meaning of equal protection and usurped the judiciary’s constitutional 
function.387 At this point, the State moved more decisively to a pro-LGBT 
position. The same attorney general, Jerry Brown, who defended the marriage 
 
 381 See Douglas NeJaime, The California Marriage Case and the Mainstreaming of Gay Rights, JURIST 
(Mar. 10, 2008), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2008/03/california-marriage-case-and.php. 
 382 See Broadcasts, CAL. COURTS, http://www.courts.ca.gov/2961.htm (last visited July 5, 2012) (follow 
“In re Marriages Cases” hyperlink). 
 383 See NeJaime, supra note 381. 
 384 See Broadcasts, supra note 382. 
 385 See Amended Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Including Writ of Mandate and Request for Immediate 
Injunctive Relief; Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (No. 
S168047) [hereinafter Strauss Amended Petition]. 
 386 See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1–2. 
 387 Strauss Amended Petition, supra note 385, at 23, 35. 
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restriction in the Marriage Cases litigation, joined the LGBT rights side in 
Strauss v. Horton.388 Brown cited the California Supreme Court’s Marriage 
Cases decision as providing the rationale for doing so.389 He claimed that a 
constitutional amendment could not eliminate a fundamental right without a 
compelling justification, and no such justification existed for Proposition 8.390 
In other words, the earlier LGBT rights legal triumph influenced the state 
attorney general in a more pro-LGBT direction and furnished the doctrinal 
basis—a constitutional fundamental right—for his new position. 
AFER and its lawyers were well aware of Brown’s pro-marriage-equality 
position (as well as Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s similar, but more 
recent, position) at the time they were considering a federal lawsuit 
challenging Proposition 8. Brown’s shift in Strauss laid the groundwork for his 
pro-LGBT position in Perry, in which he answered the complaint by admitting 
that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution.391 
Schwarzenegger similarly refused to defend California’s constitutional 
provision in Perry.392 The actions of Brown and Schwarzenegger isolated the 
official proponents of Proposition 8.393 Brown followed up his trial court 
actions with his refusal to appeal the district court decision invalidating the 
amendment,394 thereby creating the standing issue that sidetracked the 
litigation and brought the California Supreme Court back into the 
conversation.395 As Governor, Brown maintained his position, and his 
successor in the Attorney General’s Office, Kamala Harris, carried forward 
Brown’s refusal to defend the initiative. Harris argued to the California 
Supreme Court that proposition proponents did not have standing to defend the 
initiative in the absence of the state’s defense.396 Therefore, aside from some 
conservative county government entities, opposition to the marriage-equality 
 
 388 See Answer Brief in Response to Petition for Extraordinary Relief at 5–6, Strauss, 207 P.3d 48 (No. 
S168047). 
 389 Id. at 5. 
 390 Id. 
 391 Answer of Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW). 
 392 Maura Dolan, Gov. Won’t Defend Proposition 8, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2009, at A4. 
 393 See NeJaime, supra note 103, at 191. 
 394 Maura Dolan & Carol J. Williams, Brown Again Says Prop. 8 Should Be Struck Down, L.A. TIMES, 
June 13, 2009, at A13. 
 395 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 396 Brief of Attorney General Kamala D. Harris as Amicus Curiae, Perry v. Brown, 52 Cal. 4th 1116 
(2011) (No. S189476). The California Supreme Court ultimately concluded that, under California law, when 
state officials refuse to defend an initiative, the proposition proponents have the authority to defend the 
initiative and appeal an adverse decision. See Perry, 52 Cal. 4th 1116. 
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cause in California at this point emerges solely from the organized 
countermovement, rather than from the state. In California, the LGBT 
movement has obtained insider status.397 
b. Federal Judges 
Not only has AFER seized on openings offered by California government 
officials, but the organization has also benefited from a more hospitable federal 
judiciary. The federal bench has not become more liberal as a general matter or 
more Democratic; in fact, quite the opposite is true.398 Yet, federal judges, who 
are influenced by broader cultural shifts,399 have become increasingly 
sympathetic to LGBT equality claims. Indeed, Republican appointees have 
issued some of the most important recent decisions.400 
In this sense, it is important to consider judges as part of the political 
opportunity structure and as resources upon which movements rely.401 
Understanding courts and judges as part of the political opportunity structure 
suggests that doctrinal development constitutes an important component of that 
structure.402 LGBT rights advocates’ legal mobilization strategy created 
doctrine favorable to lesbians and gay men. Judges at both the state and federal 
levels have been increasingly willing to use these doctrinal openings to expand 
 
 397 Similar observations have been made in other movement contexts. See STAGGENBORG, supra note 58, 
at 77 (documenting the way in which the women’s movement successfully advanced toward political “insider” 
status); Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, 
Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 335 (2006) (describing a process by which the state adopts a particular brand of feminism). 
 398 See McCann & Dudas, supra note 128, at 38; see also Rhode, supra note 187, at 2037. 
 399 See Schacter, supra note 244, at 1399–1400 (situating judges in the broader political and cultural 
contexts in which they operate). 
 400 See Joshua Green, Editorial, GOP Judges Back Gay Marriage, BOS. GLOBE, July 15, 2010, at A19. As 
Suzanne Goldberg argues, “[C]ourts are inescapably involved in absorbing, evaluating, and influencing 
changes to popular judgments regarding social groups.” Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: 
Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1961 (2006) (footnote 
omitted). 
 401 See ANDERSEN, supra note 86, at 10 (“The elites in [the legal opportunity structure] are generally 
judges.”); STAGGENBORG, supra note 58, at 134 (arguing that the Reagan Administration’s “most potent 
weapon against abortion . . . was its ability to alter the composition of the courts, including both the lower 
federal courts and the Supreme Court, through judicial appointments”); Rhode, supra note 187, at 2037 
(discussing courts as part of the political opportunity structure); see also BALKIN, supra note 36, at 217 
(relating the composition of the judiciary to the contingencies of other levers of political power). 
 402 Cf. ANDERSEN, supra note 86, at 13 (positioning “the doctrinal framework” in the legal opportunity 
structure); PARIS, supra note 25, at 233 (“In the language of social movement scholars, legal framing options 
and choices within legal doctrines and court processes should be conceptualized as a species of political 
opportunity.”). 
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LGBT rights.403 Indeed, the courts frequently have outpaced the legislative 
process.404 With significant constitutional development on sexual-orientation 
equality and sexual liberty, and with individual judges sympathetic to 
movement claims, advocates have found the judiciary to be the most receptive 
branch for LGBT rights claims. 
In the 1990s, state courts began to announce important equality rights 
regarding the formal recognition of same-sex relationships.405 More recently, 
state courts have held, under state constitutional law, that the fundamental right 
to marry includes lesbians and gay men and that sexual orientation merits 
heightened scrutiny for equal protection purposes.406 On the federal level, 
Lawrence recognized a protected liberty interest in same-sex intimacy and 
affirmed the dignity of lesbians and gay men.407 Lower federal courts have 
elaborated on Lawrence in cases challenging the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” policy, finding that restrictions on private, adult, same-sex intimacy 
should be subjected to a heightened form of scrutiny for substantive due 
process purposes.408 DOMA litigation has permitted a federal district court, 
relying on both Lawrence and Romer v. Evans,409 to find that the federal 
government’s denial of recognition to valid state law marriages violates federal 
equal protection principles.410 In other words, key judicial decisions have 
established doctrinal principles that create openings for LGBT rights advocacy 
in the courts, including at the federal level. An important advance on one issue 
provides the doctrinal (and moral) basis for subsequent advances. 
 
 403 As Robert Post argues, “It is precisely because constitutional law is not autonomous from culture that 
constitutional law properly evolves as culture evolves.” Post, supra note 36, at 83; accord Eskridge, supra note 
38, at 499; Eskridge, supra note 36, at 2066. 
 404 See John M. Broder, Groups Debate Slower Strategy on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at A1 
(“The legal strategy to win marriage rights is a decade ahead of the political strategies to educate the public 
and the legislatures . . . .” (quoting Matt Foreman, Executive Director, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Eskridge, supra note 38, at 447. 
 405 See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 406 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009); Kerrigan v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 
2009). 
 407 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 408 See Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008); Log Cabin Republicans v. United 
States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 2010), vacated per curiam as moot, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 409 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 410 See Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 10–2204, 10–2207, 10–2214, 2012 WL 1948017 (1st Cir. May 
31, 2012). 
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In striking down Proposition 8 after an extensive trial in Perry, Judge 
Walker relied heavily on doctrinal developments at both the state and federal 
levels. First, key state law advances for lesbians and gay men provided the 
framework with which Walker could reject the Proposition 8 proponents’ 
purported objectives.411 Procreation and childrearing, Walker reasoned, could 
not form the basis for Proposition 8 because California courts had recognized 
the equal parental rights of lesbians and gay men, and California family law 
had become formally gender neutral.412 
Second, significant constitutional developments created space for Walker 
to find Proposition 8 unconstitutional. He relied on federal constitutional 
principles, and the analogous reasoning of the California Supreme Court 
interpreting state constitutional law, to find that same-sex couples possess a 
fundamental right to marry and that sexual orientation has all of the markers of 
a suspect classification.413 Yet instead of applying strict scrutiny to the 
marriage claim—a move that would have been unprecedented in the federal 
courts—Walker applied a rigorous form of rational-basis review.414 In doing 
so, he took his lead from Justice Kennedy’s landmark decisions in Romer and 
Lawrence as well as from Justice O’Connor’s Lawrence concurrence.415 While 
rational-basis review is traditionally deferential, Walker applied a more 
demanding form. Echoing Kennedy’s Romer analysis, Walker found that 
Proposition 8 singled out same-sex couples solely for the purpose of labeling 
them inferior, and he rejected any purported state interest in asserting the 
superiority of heterosexuality.416 O’Connor’s equal protection analysis in 
Lawrence bolstered this reasoning.417 Moreover, Walker invoked Lawrence to 
affirm the dignity of same-sex relationships and stake out the equal status of 
same- and different-sex couples.418 Of course, Romer and Lawrence did not 
involve same-sex marriage (or relationship recognition). In fact, Kennedy 
included limiting language in Lawrence to note that the case did not implicate 
the formal recognition of same-sex relationships,419 and O’Connor suggested 
that the state could assert the traditional definition of marriage as a legitimate 
 
 411 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1000–01 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. 
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 412 See id. at 921, 958, 968–69. 
 413 Id. at 993–94, 996–97. 
 414 Id. at 997. 
 415 Id. at 1002–03. 
 416 Id. at 1003. 
 417 Id. at 1002. 
 418 Id. 
 419 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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governmental interest to defend a marriage restriction.420 But while Romer and 
Lawrence did not provide precedent that dictated the result in Perry, the 
opinions provided the doctrinal openings and moral sentiment that allowed a 
sympathetic federal judge to move the law in a more expansive direction and to 
thereby further protect same-sex couples.421 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed Walker’s ruling, doing so on 
the narrowest grounds available.422 In his opinion for the court, Judge 
Reinhardt relied extensively on Romer, both as a factual and doctrinal matter. 
He found “Proposition 8 . . . remarkably similar to Amendment 2,”423 the 
Colorado law in Romer that repealed and prohibited antidiscrimination 
protections for lesbians and gay men.424 “Like Amendment 2,” Reinhardt 
reasoned, “Proposition 8 denies ‘equal protection of the laws in the most literal 
sense,’ because it ‘carves out’ an ‘exception’ to California’s equal protection 
clause, by removing equal access to marriage, which gays and lesbians had 
previously enjoyed, from the scope of that constitutional guarantee.”425 
Quoting Romer, he claimed that, if no legitimate state interest exists to support 
Proposition 8, “we must infer that it was enacted with only the constitutionally 
illegitimate basis of ‘animus toward the class it affects.’”426 Like Walker, 
Reinhardt found that California’s pro-LGBT laws rendered the purported 
interests in procreation and childrearing untenable.427 He was left to conclude, 
again quoting Romer, that “‘the inevitable inference [is] that the disadvantage 
imposed is born of animosity toward,’ or, as is more likely with respect to 
Californians who voted for the Proposition, mere disapproval of, ‘the class of 
persons affected.’”428 Ultimately, “[l]ike Amendment 2, Proposition 8 is a 
classification of gays and lesbians undertaken for its own sake.”429 This, 
Reinhardt announced, the Equal Protection Clause will not tolerate.430 Again, 
while Romer did not involve relationship recognition for same-sex couples, the 
decision articulated a sexual-orientation-equality principle in the context of 
 
 420 Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 421 See Post, supra note 36, at 108. 
 422 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 423 Id. at 1081. 
 424 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). 
 425 Perry, 671 F.3d at 1081 (citation omitted) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633, and Strauss v. Horton, 207 
P.3d 48, 61 (Cal. 2009)). 
 426 Id. at 1082 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 632). 
 427 See id. at 1086–90. 
 428 Id. at 1093 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634). 
 429 Id. at 1094. 
 430 Id. at 1095. 
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anti-gay initiatives. Sympathetic federal judges could apply that principle to 
new contexts in which state initiatives harmed lesbians and gay men.431 
In this sense, the doctrinal framework is part of the changing political 
opportunity structure upon which advocates seize when they consider making 
demands by claiming rights in court. As Robert Post argues in his insightful 
analysis of the relationship between culture and the development of 
constitutional law, controversial constitutional decisions may gradually 
become common wisdom. Lawrence, for instance, “increasingly acquire[s] an 
aura of legality as it is imbricated within a chain of judicial decisions that treat 
[it] as a legitimate judgment.”432 Moreover, the principles of such decisions 
begin to apply in new situations; pro-LGBT decisions (like Romer and 
Lawrence) provide the logic for additional pro-LGBT decisions (like Perry).433 
For social movement activists, then, constitutional developments are resources 
that can be mobilized for change. The influence of constitutional 
pronouncements does not end with the instant case; instead, advocates seize on 
such pronouncements as part of their ongoing work both inside and outside the 
courts. 
AFER has placed its hopes in a potentially sympathetic Supreme Court, 
with Justice Kennedy as the crucial swing vote.434 AFER’s optimism springs 
from the movement’s successful litigation in Romer and Lawrence, which 
provided Kennedy with opportunities to demonstrate his commitment to 
sexual-orientation equality and to develop doctrinal bases on which to later rest 
a marriage-equality ruling.435 AFER is hoping that Kennedy will take the 
invitation furnished by the lower federal courts to apply Romer and Lawrence 
to marriage recognition and move the law forward with respect to LGBT 
 
 431 Like Walker, Reinhardt also found Lawrence instructive, relying on both Kennedy’s majority opinion 
and O’Connor’s concurrence. See id. at 1095. 
 432 See Post, supra note 36, at 108. 
 433 See id. (“[Lawrence] will grow in legal authority as future decisions manifest respect for Lawrence’s 
principles, as the Court appeals to the logic of those principles to control the outcome of cases, and as 
Lawrence’s logic is used to orient the ongoing development of the law.”). 
 434 See Stein, supra note 235. 
 435 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Post’s point about 
Lawrence seems especially critical here: The Court, led by Justice Kennedy, entered “the national debate about 
the status of homosexuality in a manner that stresses the positive value of nondiscrimination while preserving 
the Court’s options in deciding how far it is willing to go in striking down legislation adversely affecting 
homosexuals.” Post, supra note 36, at 101. 
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rights.436 In fact, in their respective opinions, both Reinhardt and Walker 
seemed to be speaking to Kennedy.437 
Understanding the way in which social movement advocates specifically 
target judges suggests that judges themselves function as elite allies whom 
movements seek to activate.438 Not only does this view find a theoretical 
grounding in scholarship on movement–state overlap,439 but it also resonates 
with Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson’s influential theory of “partisan 
entrenchment.”440 Federal judges “are temporally extended representatives of 
particular parties, and hence, of popular understandings about public policy 
and the Constitution.”441 They enact constitutional (and political) views that 
social movements and political parties have been honing in the background.442 
Social movement actors articulate constitutional visions and attempt to 
persuade political leaders that those visions are correct; if they are successful, 
political leaders endorse the movement’s claims and eventually appoint judges 
who share some of the movement’s constitutional positions.443 This is not to 
say that judges are doing politics, instead of law.444 Rather, it is to suggest that 
constitutional change and political and social mobilizations are so intertwined 
that, in interpreting and applying legal doctrine, judges are influenced by—
and, in turn, influence—notions about constitutional meaning that originate 
outside the courts.445 
 
 436 Of course, AFER has been pushing claims that ask for much broader substantive due process and equal 
protection holdings than reliance on Romer and Lawrence would suggest. 
 437 See Dolan & Williams, supra note 235; John Schwartz, In Same-Sex Ruling, an Eye on the Supreme 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/us/06assess.html; see also Clifford J. 
Rosky, Perry v. Schwarzenegger and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage Law, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 913, 981 
(2011). 
 438 Post argues that because culture and constitutional law are in a dialogical relationship, judges cannot 
work as “neutral observer[s]” but must instead “intervene[] in culture wars.” Post, supra note 36, at 84 
(quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord 
BALKIN, supra note 36, at 63 (explaining that social movements “attempt[] to change attitudes (especially elite 
attitudes) about what the Constitution means, and hence influence[] judicial decisionmaking, because judges 
are largely drawn from elites”). 
 439 While social movement work on movement insiders makes passing reference to judges, see 
BANASZAK, supra note 356, at 199 (“Movement–state intersections can occur in the form of elected officials, 
judges, and nongovernmental organizations pulled into the state.”), it does not offer sustained treatment of 
judges as institutional activists. 
 440 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 36, at 1067. 
 441 Id. 
 442 See id. at 1075. 
 443 See BALKIN, supra note 36, at 31, 71. 
 444 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 333 (2011). 
 445 See BALKIN, supra note 36, at 201–02. 
NEJAIME GALLEYS4 7/5/2012 2:02 PM 
732 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:663 
Going further, countermovement activists increasingly frame judges ruling 
favorably on marriage equality not simply as institutional allies but as social 
movement insiders embedded in the state.446 Immediately after Judge Walker’s 
decision, Proposition 8 supporters made much of the judge’s sexual 
orientation, suggesting that pro-gay forces had found a gay judge to decide 
their claim.447 When Walker confirmed his same-sex relationship, Proposition 
8 proponents moved to vacate his trial court decision, arguing that he should 
have recused himself.448 Marriage-equality supporters, media commentators, 
and ethics experts rightly criticized the motion to vacate,449 but did not 
recognize the blurred line between the movement and the judiciary that the 
dispute revealed. Even though, as the district court held,450 a gay judge should 
not recuse himself from a marriage case, advocates may benefit from the 
opportunity to present their claim to a decision maker who shares movement 
members’ identity and who understands firsthand the movement’s grievances. 
Similarly, before oral argument at the Ninth Circuit, Proposition 8 
proponents sought to disqualify Judge Reinhardt.451 Reinhardt’s wife, Rimona 
 
 446 For scholarship pointing toward the social movement connections of judges, most notably those on the 
federal bench and specifically on the Supreme Court, see Baum & Devins, supra note 322, at 1541–42 
(identifying Supreme Court Justices with both liberal and conservative movement organizations); and Siegel, 
supra note 38, at 1347 (“Justice Scalia and other avatars of the Reagan revolution regularly employ the 
language of originalism to exhort Americans to mobilize against the Court and seek constitutional change 
without the intermediation of constitutional lawmaking.”). On a related note, some scholars have analyzed the 
practices and beliefs of Supreme Court Justices who had careers as social movement lawyers. See, e.g., 
WASBY ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER: AN EXPLORATION OF SUPREME COURT 
STRATEGIES (1977); Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010); Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on 
Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 771 (2010). 
 447 Judicial Bias Is Alleged in a Ruling on Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011, at A12; Press Release, 
Nat’l Org. for Marriage, National Organization for Marriage Decries Federal Court Decision Invalidating 
Proposition 8; Calls on the Supreme Court and Congress to Protect Americans’ Right to Vote for Marriage 
(Aug. 4, 2010), available at http://www.nationformarriage.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c= 
omL2KeN0LzH&b=5075189&ct=8569893. 
 448 See Defendant-Intervenors Dennis Hollingsworth, Gail J. Knight, Martin F. Gutierrez, Mark A. 
Jansson, and ProtectMarriage.com’s Motion to Vacate Judgment, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 
1119 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. C 09-02292 JW). 
 449 See Plaintiff-Intervenor City and County of San Francisco’s Opposition to Defendant-Intervenors’ 
Motion to Vacate Judgment, Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (No. C 09-02292 JW); State Defendants’ Opposition 
to Motion to Vacate Judgment, Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (No. C 09-02292 JW); Brief of Amici Curiae 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. et al. in Opposition to Proponents’ Motion to Vacate 
Judgment, Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (No. C 09-02292 JW); Editorial, Fit to Rule on Same-Sex Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2011, at A28. 
 450 Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119. 
 451 See Appellants’ Motion for Disqualification, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(No. 10-16696). 
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Ripston, had been head of the ACLU of Southern California at the time the 
organization submitted an amicus brief at the district court with other pro-
LGBT public interest organizations.452 And her organization had taken a public 
position in favor of marriage equality and against Proposition 8.453 Reinhardt 
did not recuse himself, largely based on a separation between the views of a 
judge and his spouse.454 Interestingly, he noted that, normally, when the ACLU 
of Southern California files an amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit proceeding, he 
refuses to serve on the panel.455 While the ACLU of Southern California had 
filed an amicus brief at the district court, it did not file at the Ninth Circuit, 
instead leaving that task to the institutionally separate ACLU of Northern 
California. 
The experiences with both Judges Walker and Reinhardt suggest that social 
movement activists do not see judges as impartial outsiders. They are not, as 
Chief Justice Roberts claimed, neutral “umpires,” “call[ing] balls and 
strikes.”456 Rather, judges are, at a minimum, part of a dynamic political 
opportunity structure in which they function as sympathetic or hostile elites. 
And in the eyes of some activists, judges are more than that; they are social 
movement actors embedded in the state, using their elite institutional positions 
to enact the constitutional, political, and moral vision pushed by the movement 
with which they identify. Of course, the knowledge that one has allies or 
fellow movement members on the federal bench makes litigation tactics more 
attractive. Again, institutional allies and elite support may, quite reasonably, 
channel movement activity into institutional tactics and moderate goals. 
CONCLUSION—MANAGING THE DILEMMA 
This Article attempts to bring social movement theory to sociolegal 
scholarship on litigation tactics to identify an important phenomenon—the 
legal mobilization dilemma. AFER’s movement challenge was made possible, 
 
 452 See Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU Foundation of Northern California et al., Perry, 630 F.3d 909 (No. 
10-16696) [hereinafter Perry Brief of Amici Curiae]. 
 453 Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, Federal Judge: Prop 8 Unconstitutional (Aug. 4, 2010), 
http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=press_Prop8FederalChallenge080410; Matt Coles et al., 
Prop 8: Focusing on the Wrong Question, ACLU S. CAL. (July 14, 2009), http://www.aclu-
sc.org/news_stories/view/102830/. 
 454 Perry, 630 F.3d at 911–12. 
 455 Id. at 916 n.8. 
 456 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United 
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2005) (statement of John G. 
Roberts, Jr., J., D.C. Circuit). 
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in part, because of the movement’s successful legal mobilization: LGBT 
movement lawyers’ productive use of court-centered tactics changed the 
landscape in ways that permitted a new organization, AFER, and its famous 
lawyers, Olson and Boies, to initiate a powerful litigation campaign that 
challenged the coordinated state-based movement strategy. In other words, 
while the LGBT movement’s legal mobilization strategy can boast great 
success, viable challenges to that strategy emerge precisely because of such 
success. 
Why pursue legal mobilization at all if one’s success may ultimately 
contribute to one’s downfall? The outlook is nowhere near that grim. Rather 
than simply turn over the reins to AFER, LGBT movement advocates 
integrated the litigation into their state-based approach.457 
In their amicus role in Perry, lawyers at Lambda Legal, NCLR, and the 
ACLU tried to persuade the courts to limit the reach of the case by viewing the 
substantive issues in a limited, fact-specific way. They argued that the 
particular situation in California is unique, and as a result, a holding in the case 
should not directly implicate the laws of (most) other states.458 They claimed 
that, because California actually eliminated the right of same-sex couples to 
marry and maintained a domestic-partnership system solely to differentiate 
same- and different-sex couples, the courts need only apply rational-basis 
review to find Proposition 8 unconstitutional.459 The California-specific factual 
and doctrinal reframing attempts to provide the best opportunity for a denial of 
certiorari by the Supreme Court, a favorable decision by the Court if it takes 
the case, and the least destructive aftermath if the Court decides against the 
plaintiffs. 
 
 457 Rubenstein and Tushnet make similar observations in the civil rights context. Rubenstein notes how 
Marshall reacted to Vaughn’s work on Shelley by pursuing another restrictive covenant case and seeking 
consolidation at the Supreme Court. See Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 1629–30. Tushnet explains how Marshall 
positioned equalization, the remedy pursued by Wesley, as merely an alternative in more far-reaching attacks 
on segregation. See TUSHNET, supra note 17, at 109. 
 458 Perry Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 452, at 1 (“While amici also agree that Proposition 8 violates 
the federal guarantees of equal protection and due process, amici submit this brief to emphasize the singular 
nature of the case presented by Proposition 8, and the California-focused analysis that accordingly is 
warranted. Amici therefore address only the question of whether, in light of the particular circumstances of this 
ballot measure, plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim.” (emphases 
added)). 
 459 See id. at 9–11. The City and County of San Francisco, a plaintiff-intervenor in Perry, also urged the 
court to follow this narrow, California-specific path. See Plaintiff–Intervenor–Appellee City and County of 
San Francisco’s Response Brief, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577). 
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This approach has met with success. In holding Proposition 8 
unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit panel relied on the extremely narrow 
grounds articulated by the LGBT movement lawyers.460 And the court’s 
extensive reliance on Romer echoed the rational-basis arguments pressed by 
the movement organizations.461 In the immediate wake of the ruling, 
commentators noted the effects on AFER’s Supreme Court strategy. Now, as 
movement advocates had hoped, the Court could avoid the case or issue a 
narrow ruling limited to California.462 
In keeping with their belief that federal litigation builds on—and, in fact, 
depends on—state-based advances, LGBT movement advocates also continue 
to pursue state-level change to create a more favorable national landscape. This 
effort relies on both legislation and litigation. In California, advocates secured 
passage of SB 54, which recognizes the marriages (for state law purposes) of 
same-sex couples married in other states before passage of Proposition 8.463 At 
the same time, advocates obtained comprehensive (nonmarital) relationship 
recognition in additional states and achieved marriage equality in New York.464 
Lambda Legal’s recent state court challenge in New Jersey seeks to secure 
marriage equality in that state.465 These efforts ensure that, when the Supreme 
Court ultimately confronts the marriage issue, there will be, as compared to 
when Perry was filed, more states with relationship recognition for same-sex 
couples and many more same-sex couples in marriages and other legally 
recognized relationships. 
Movement lawyers’ response to Perry underscores the risks of the legal 
mobilization dilemma, as activists redirect energy and resources toward 
litigation they wanted to avoid. But their response also highlights the 
 
 460 See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1063–64. 
 461 See id. at 1093–95. For their reliance on Romer, see Perry Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 452, at 
11–21. Other amicus briefs, most notably a brief filed by a group of constitutional law professors led by 
William Eskridge, argued that Romer should guide the analysis in Perry. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae, 
Professor William N. Eskridge Jr. et al. in Support of Appellees, Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 (Nos. 10-16696, 11-
16577). 
 462 See Dolan & Williams, supra note 235. 
 463 CAL. FAM. CODE § 308(b) (West Supp. 2012). 
 464 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2011). At the time this Article went to print, lawmakers 
in Washington and Maryland had passed marriage-equality laws, but opponents were pursuing voter initiatives 
to block the laws from taking effect. See Davis, supra note 84; Yardley, supra note 84. 
 465 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 140. More recently, Lambda Legal 
has filed marriage-equality lawsuits in Nevada federal court and Illinois state court. See Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Sevcik v. Sandoval, No. 2:12-cv-00578 (D. Nev. Apr. 10, 2012); Complaint 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Darby v. Orr, No. 12CH19718 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 30, 2012). 
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adaptability and resilience of their legal mobilization strategy.466 Rather than 
pack up and go home, advocates at leading LGBT rights organizations have 
integrated the suit into their tactical repertoire.467 
Even as movement leaders react to what they see as the dangers of AFER’s 
litigation, they acknowledge the benefits that may come with AFER’s 
additional resources, publicity efforts, and ideologically diverse and politically 
connected support base. Future research should address not only the threats 
inherent in the legal mobilization dilemma but also the potential gains. How 
might the AFER litigation aid the movement? How might it provoke important 
discussions about strategy and the role of courts? How might it diversify the 
movement both demographically and ideologically? Answering these questions 
demands consideration of movement definition. Who is a movement insider? 
Where does the movement end and allied support begin? What roles do allies 
and supportive elites play in a movement’s trajectory?468 This Article’s 
elaboration of the legal mobilization dilemma suggests the need for research 
analyzing legal mobilization’s influence on movement boundaries. 
 
 
 466 Much social movement scholarship focuses on changing movement strategy in response to 
countermovement action and the state. See, e.g., Meyer & Staggenborg, supra note 187, at 231. But movement 
actors also change strategy based on internal and allied activity. 
 467 Analyzing the LGBT movement response bolsters recent scholarly accounts of public interest lawyers’ 
sophisticated and multidimensional approach. See, e.g., Scott Barclay & Anna-Maria Marshall, Supporting a 
Cause, Developing a Movement, and Consolidating a Practice: Cause Lawyers and Sexual Orientation 
Litigation in Vermont, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL 
PRACTICE, supra note 37, at 171, 184; Scott L. Cummings, Hemmed In: Legal Mobilization in the Los Angeles 
Anti-Sweatshop Movement, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6 (2009); Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 
69, at 1241–42; Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s “Allurements”: A Relational 
Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS 
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 261, 276 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); Rhode, supra 
note 187, at 2046–49; Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the “Myth of Rights” in Civil Rights and Poverty 
Practice, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469, 472–73 (1999); Stein et al., supra note 62, at 1685–91; Waterstone et al., 
supra note 64 (manuscript at 43–46). 
 468 I addressed some of these issues in an earlier article, see NeJaime, supra note 103, at 203–04, but more 
work needs to be done on the general question of movement boundaries. 
